We will talk about the results of this in class. Be sure to do all the exercises, not to hand in, but to talk about. So, you will have to remember the results you got.
1. To test behaviorism, answer the following questions to yourself:
Suppose you have the belief that it is raining right now, and suppose that you are inside wherever you normally live, and suppose that you are now leaving to go to class. What specific behaviors will you engage in that would show that you believe it is raining right now? Would you always engage in these behaviors every time you believed it is raining right now and you were leaving your living space? Would everyone else engage in these behaviors every time they leave their living space and go outside when they believe it is raining?
The point: believing something is mental. The behaviorist needs to "reduce" the mental to behavior brought about by various external physical stimuli. So, the belief that it is raining, brought about in someone by being told, or by looking outside, should result in certain behavior patterns. The exercise is designed to raise questions about whether the belief really does bring about identifiable behavior patterns. Aren't the possible behavioral manifestations of the belief extremely varied from time to time, person to person, situation to situation? For example, some people might not care about getting wet, while others do care.
Why is this a problem for behaviorism?
2. To understand some of the objections to mind-brain identity theory, try this:
Suppose you visually aware of a McDonald's emblem in a commercial or on a sign that is presently in view. (I mean the red "M" made of two linked arches.) So, suppose you are experiencing that emblem in your visual field right now. Let's not worry about what else is in your visual field; just concentrate on the red "M". List a few of the obvious, trivial properties of your experiencing the visual image. (For example, it would not be painful, probably, but it might be vivid.)
Next, suppose that the identity theory were right. That would mean that your present experience of the McDonald's "M" is nothing more or less than a certain specific physical brain state that your brain is now in. (Perhaps certain parts of the brain are engaged in certain specific activities--the neurons in that part of the brain are firing in a certain pattern, maybe.)
Now, here comes the point: could all of the properties of your experience that you listed above possibly be properties of a brain state? (If you did this right, the answer will come out "NO", because some of the properties of the experience will not be the sort of properties that a brain state could have.)
Why is this supposed to be a problem for the identity theory?
3. To understand functionalism, you have to first understand the idea of performing a function in a system. Describe to yourself the function of a thermostat in a heating and cooling system in a building. What external influences work on the thermostat? What results does it produce in response?
Next, notice that the very same functions might be performed by a variety of differently constructed objects. For example, one manufacturer might make a thermostat a little differently from another one. It doesn't really matter how the object is constructed. If it performs the function, it is a thermostat. We might say that the thermostat functionality is "multiply realizable". That simply means that thermostats can be constructed in different ways of different materials, and that they will still be thermostats as long as they perform the thermostat function. Being a thermostat seems to be something that can be defined in terms of function rather than in terms of physical structure.
The idea of functionalism about the mind is to try to define mental activity, or mental states like believing, desiring, feeling, all in terms of the functions these perform in the life of the individual. The general picture is that various external stimuli impact our bodies, and these inputs are processed by various functional mechanisms "inside" of us, producing behavioral outputs. The functional mechanisms inside us might be constructed in any number of different ways, but none of that matters. What matters is the functions being performed by these mechanisms. (The "mechanisms" might even be nonphysical.)
Example: if I believe it is raining, according to functionalism that belief is not represented as a brain structure, but rather as something that performs a function in my life, producing behavior. It doesn't matter what is going on inside, as long as the function is performed. It might be performed by the brain, or by the heart, by the kidneys, or by a Cartesian mind. It might be performed by a computer chip implanted into me. The hardware doesn't matter. The function matters. So long as the function is performed, the belief is there, for the belief just is the capacity to perform the specific function.
If you are understanding this, you should be able to see that if a computer can perform the relevant functions, then the computer believes it is raining. Imagine a robot that can move inside and outside of the building on its own. What behavioral functions might be performed by the computer's belief that it is raining?
Now, to get closer to Searle's Chinese Room Argument, think about this: what behavioral functions would be performed by an understanding of the Chinese language? If a computer could be constructed to perform these functions as well as a human being can, would you agree that the computer had an understanding of the Chinese language? (Searle does not think so.)