In this reading, Kant tries to convince us that the spatial and temporal features of our sensory experience are due to the way we process the incoming stream of data, and are thus not part of the world as it is in itself. In other words we form our sensory impressions so as to make them temporal and we form many of them so as to make them spatial. Note that even though Kant starts with discussing space, the only form which he identifies as being completely universal, applying to all sensation, is time.
It will turn out that it is the temporal character of human sensibility on which Kant will rely for his argument that we can know things a priori about the world of our experience. The spatial character of some large portions of human sensibility turns out not to matter much, since Kant is looking for features that apply to all experience. Only completely universal features can be known a priori to apply to all experience.
Here are some questions to write about, briefly, as ways of thinking about the issues raised in this reading.
1. When Kant talks about human sensibility, he has in mind something a little broader than what people usually have in mind when they talk about sensation. Can you think of some ways in which humans are affected (by "objects") that are not normally included under the label "sensation"? (Hint: think about your own body as an object.)
2. Here's a closely-related question: Can you come up with some examples of human sensibility that are temporal, but not spatial? (That is, roughly, something like sensations whose contents seem to the experiencer not to have any location, nor shape or size, even though these sensation-like phenomena have temporal characteristics, such as occurring after or before other sensation-like phenomena.)
3. Kant claims that all human sensation-like phenomena are necessarily temporal in character. What reasons does he have for saying this?
4. What does he mean when he says that space and time are forms of (sensible) intuition? What might be the difference between time's being a form of intuition and its being the content of all intuitions?