Kantian arguments about space and time

B38 - B40 present 4 numbered arguments about space.  I think these arguments are all supposed to point to the same two-part complex conclusion:

1. The spatial character of the things we perceive as being outside of our own consciousness is not a conceptualization but is instead something built right into the awareness of these things.

2. The spatial character of things which present themselves to us as being outside of our own consciousness is not something that we infer from paying attention to many examples and abstracting from their details, as happens when one creates an inductive generalization.  Rather, the spatial character is something we can know about a priori because it makes possible all the examples of specific awarenesses of outer things.

See if you think I'm right about the conclusions by looking at what Kant says.  Try to figure out the arguments.

The next few pages Kant refers to as giving a "transcendental" exposition.  When Kant uses the word "transcendental" it means, roughly, that he thinks he is giving the only explanation of how some assumed fact could be true.  In other words, a transcendental exposition goes something like this:

1. (To be accomplished before the transcendental exposition gets started): Come to an agreement that some interesting claim is indeed a fact.  E.g., show that we have a priori knowledge of some features of the space that outer objects occupy.  (In the present reading, this is the point of the "metaphysical" exposition.)
2. (Here is the actual beginning of the transcendental argument.)  Show that the fact listed above can be explained in only one way -- let's abbreviate the explanation as E.  E.g., show that the only possible explanation for our a priori knowledge of space is that space is a form of intuition of outer phenomena.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, E is true.

So, the ultimate conclusion that space is a form of intuition is arrived at by a two-stage argument.  First comes the metaphysical arguments that are supposed to show (among other things) that space is knowable a priori.  Second, comes the transcendental argument that is supposed to show that the only possible explanation for this fact about space is that space is the form of outer intuition.

The arguments about time are supposed to work in similar fashion.  First a metaphysical exposition, and then a transcendental one.  The ultimate conclusion is that time is a form of intuition.

Look for this structure.  Try to figure out why Kant thinks he has adequate reasons for each step.  (That's the hard part!)

As you read, remember that Kant is not talking about some abstract conception of time or space.  He is talking about the real space and time that we think we live in and that we experience all the time.  So, if someone said they can dream up an abstract model of time according to which time didn't flow smoothly, but rather clunked along in jerks, or fits and starts, Kant might say "That's an interesting thing to play around with, but I am interested in the character of the time we measure our lives by, the time that passes while we sleep, the time it takes to make a trip."