Mark Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications: National Institutions, Convergence, and Change.  New York, Oxford University Press, 1999. 

Reviewed by Lori A. Brainard brainard@gwu.edu
Department of Public Administration, the George Washington University 

Mark Thatcher's The Politics of Telecommunications primarily is about institutions and institutionalist theory and secondarily is about technology.  Nevertheless, the book also is useful to those interested in telecommunications policy generally and telecommunications policy in Britain and France specifically.  Thatcher's overarching objective is to test, and ultimately contribute to the refining of, institutionalist theory which argues that different countries have different institutional frameworks that are stable and that different national institutional frameworks result in different patterns of policymaking and different economic outcomes.  The author uses telecommunications policy as a case study to test institutionalist claims. 

Thatcher finds that, prior to 1969, Britain and France had similar institutional frameworks for telecommunications.  Specifically telecommunications systems in both countries were public monopolies.  Beginning in the late 1960s, both countries began to face common external pressures for change in the form of technological innovation, the existence of supranational regulatory bodies, and telecommunications deregulation in the United States.  Between 1969 and 1990 the institutional frameworks of telecommunications in Britain and France diverged, as Britain privatized the sector while it remained public in France.  In the 1990s, France partially privatized its telecommunications sector and, though the institutional differences between the two countries lessened, they still remained significant.

Thatcher finds much to support institutionalist theory.  First, he provides evidence to support the theoretical claim that institutions are stable.  Indeed, Thatcher provides detailed evidence, which demonstrates that, although both Britain and France ultimately achieved significant institutional change, the changes were slow and took place only after extensive public deliberation and several iterations.  Second, Thatcher demonstrates that the different institutional frameworks of Britain and France led to different patterns of policymaking as well as different substantive policies, as evidenced by the fact that Britain privatized and liberalized earlier and more thoroughly than France.  Most importantly for institutionalist theory, Thatcher argues that despite different institutional frameworks, the economic outcomes of the telecommunications sector were largely similar in the two countries.  The latter point thus significantly challenges institutionalist theory. 

Though the book primarily is concerned with institutionalism, it is useful and important for scholars interested in telecommunications and technology policy.  The heart of the book consists of richly detailed description of change and continuity in British and French telecommunications policy-- both longitudinally and across specific policy areas (such as ownership of network operators, and the relationships between and among network operators, suppliers, users, and public officials).  Scholars of U.S. telecommunications will benefit from both the explicit and implicit comparisons made between telecommunications policy in the U.S. and abroad.  

What is most interesting and important about the book is its analysis and acceptance of the complex relationship between technology and institutions. While much of the book supports institutionalist claims, it also demonstrates that institutions are flexible.  Similarly, and more importantly for those who study technology, at a time when many either explicitly or implicitly suggest that technology is, or ought to be, the driving force behind policy and institutional change, The Politics of Telecommunications is a fresh antidote to theories of "technological determinism".