The Dialectic Today:
Critically Interrogating the Socratic Method for Contemporary Use
Ryan Patrick Canney
Illinois State University
rpcanne@ilstu.edu
Spring 2002
Introduction
If you ask people who are familiar with Plato about his
philosophy, one of the first words out of their mouth will most likely be
“dialectic.”
This should not be surprising considering that the concept is a
cornerstone of that philosophy. Since the dialectic is such an important
component in Plato’s (and Socrates’) philosophy, an examination of its
relevance today is the focus of this paper. In particular, this paper is
interested in how the dialectic can further the development of democratic
society and culture today.
To begin, it is important to distinguish between two uses of the dialectic
in Plato’s work. In one understanding of the concept, Plato, particularly
in his middle and late dialogues, uses it to describe “the total process
of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated so as to achieve
knowledge of the supreme good, the Form of the Good” (Blackburn 1996,
104). The focus of this paper, however, requires that the dialectic be
used in a different sense. The more Socratic notion is the point for
examination here. Philosopher Simon Blackburn describes the Socratic
dialectic as “the process of eliciting the truth by means of questions
aimed at opening out what is already implicitly known, or at exposing the
contradictions and muddles of an opponent’s position” (p. 104). This is a
good account of the concept, but to better understand the dialectic, this
paper analyzes four separate aspects of the dialectic as found in Plato’s
The Republic.
Generally, the dialectical method requires the following: 1) Participation
and the appearance of equal status among those involved, 2) Starting the
dialogue with commonly held views and ideas, 3) Dialogue that leads to
critical reflection amongst the participants, and 4) Connection of ideas
brought up in discussion. After a discussion of each of these points,
this paper then explores Plato’s use of the dialectic in The Republic
to locate both inconsistency and consistency in his use of it. Concluding
remarks will use this analysis to determine how the dialectic can be
revived as a practical concept for today.
The
Dialectic: In Four Parts
The first feature identified in the dialectic is the active
participation and equal status of those involved in the
investigation. This is important to point out because it is in stark
contrast with traditional views on education. Traditional approaches to
education involve what Paulo Freire calls the “banking method” of
education (to be discussed below), but long before Freire explained that
such education is oppressive, Socrates had a few words regarding such a
method. In his comparison of the Sun in the visible world to the Good in
the intelligible world, Socrates asserted:
[C]ertain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they
can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight
into blind eyes... Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity
of learning exists in the soul already.
(Plato 1991, 258)
The fundamental difference then, is that knowledge already exists in the
student. If this is accurate, then trying to “deposit” knowledge into a
student’s brain is off the mark. Rather, the teacher should work with the
student to turn that student’s eye to the knowledge. A teacher’s
determination alone will not suffice. Accordingly, critical reflection
and transformation is achieved through a student’s active participation in
her own learning.
The appearance of equal status in the experience is important for
the dialectic. This helps to discourage the student or teacher from
falling into the traditional banking method.
Rather than telling the student something, the teacher poses questions or
encourages the student to question the teacher’s statements. Plato
portrays the ideal teacher, Socrates, as having “no claim to know
anything; indeed, he is conscious of all that he does not know and,
consequently, is always searching for knowledge” (Hummel 1992, 335).
Whether Socrates truly believed that he knew nothing is outside the scope
of this paper; however, what is relevant for this paper is that the effect
of claiming ignorance is equalizing. From a student’s perspective, this
can allow her to join a discussion, because she can be unafraid of not
knowing. To dispel false statements and challenge the deep convictions of
an individual (or society), it is important for the dialectic to have such
a leveling effect. Whether this teacher/student equality is real or
imagined, what matters is that the student—at the very least—has a
perception of being on equal ground with the teacher. Although it goes
unstated in The Republic, this component of the dialectic is part
of the process of establishing transference in the student/teacher
relationship. This concept (and it’s implications for the dialectic) is
important for the concluding discussion and will be elaborated upon
later.
The second aspect of dialectic requires that any inquiry begin with
commonly held opinions on the issue. In his interpretive essay on
The Republic, Allan Bloom explains the importance of this aspect of
the dialectic. He writes:
Dialectic, beginning from the commonly held opinions, will lead to an
ultimate agreement. It is this activity which can guide us to the
discovery of the natural objects, and it implies that we begin from the
phenomena as we see them, taking them seriously in an effort to clarify
them. It is only by way of our imprisonment that a liberation can be
effected. (Bloom 1968, 406-07)
His insight suggests that by not examining commonly held truths and
opinions, people are like prisoners trying to escape a prison without
consideration for the steel bars and barbed-wire fences that hinder their
liberation. As Plato makes clear in the image of the cave, the purpose of
the dialectic is to be free from the chains and ascend to the light. If
the dialectic is to have an emancipatory effect on our minds, then
dominant ideas that oppress people must be the starting point for
liberation.
The third dimension of the dialectic is the need for discussion to reach a
point of critical reflection in the participants. For the purposes
of this paper, critical reflection refers to the ability to consider,
fairly equally, challenges or questions raised regarding a particular
issue in order to arrive at a better understanding. In discussing the
education of the Guardians, Socrates explains the importance of reflection
to Glaucon. Stating that the mind processes in two different manners,
Socrates argues that some objects “do not invite thought because the sense
is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects sense is
so untrustworthy that further enquiry is imperatively demanded” (Plato
1991, 265). When the mind receives contradictory ideas “the thinking
mind, intending to light up the chaos... [is] compelled to reverse the
process” and arrive at an opinion that is satisfactory to the “thinking
mind” (p. 265). For Socrates, then, the “thinking mind” is one that works
to resolve contradictory ideas. Thus, a teacher must suggest notions that
are contrary to “common sense.” If critical reflection takes place, then
better understanding should result.
The final dimension of the dialectic calls for the connection of ideas
in order to articulate an informed representation of reality. Talking
with Glaucon about the necessity of this aspect Socrates explains:
[T]he sciences which they [students] learned without any order in their
early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see
the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being...the
capacity of such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent:
the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical. (Plato 1991, 285)
To draw an analogy as to the importance of connecting ideas for better
understanding, consider photomosaic technology. Photomosaic technology
takes many different pictures of a particular image to create a larger
representation of that image. The photomosaic of the deceased reggae
singer Bob Marley helps illustrate this point. When observing the image
from close-up rather than from a distance, all of the small pictures of
Bob Marley seem very separate and distinct. Only after stepping back from
those individual pictures can one see the larger image formed through
their interconnectedness. Similarly, Plato argues that it is only by
observing ideas in their connection to one another that we can gain an
image or semblance of the Good. For a more contemporary perspective on
this point, Paulo Freire, educational theorist from Latin America,
explains in Pedagogy of the Oppressed:
When people lack a critical understanding of their reality, apprehending
it in fragments which they do not perceive as interacting constituent
elements of the whole, they cannot truly know that reality. To truly know
it… they would need to have a total vision of the context in order… [to]
achieve a clearer perception of the whole. (Freire 2001, 104)
Plato’s use of the Dialectic in The Republic
Now that the theoretical elements of the dialectical method
have been outlined, a more practical side will be considered. This
section examines the level of consistency between the allegory of the cave
and the discussion of justice in Book I of The Republic. This
investigation will help determine the value of the dialectic in today’s
world.
Allegory of the Cave
In explaining to his partner in inquiry, Glaucon, the state of
human knowledge, Socrates tells the story of the cave. Scholar Eric
Voegelin describes the allegory of the cave in four parts. The first
three parts are relevant for this paper. In the beginning of the story
Socrates explains that humans are imprisoned in a cave. There is a bright
light outside of the cave that produces shadows on the walls. The
prisoners interpret the shadows as their reality. The second part of the
allegory tells of one prisoner being unchained. Being released from the
chains, the prisoner is forced to turn toward the light. Not accustomed
to the light, the prisoner’s eyes hurt, and he perceives the true reality
as false and the shadows as true. The third aspect of the story describes
the prisoner being carried out of the cave and into the world of light.
The former prisoner gains greater understanding and can now discern shadow
from reality, and ultimately, he perceives the source of the light (Voegelin
2000, 114).
Since the allegory of the cave is the central metaphor for
human transformation in The Republic, it is important to carefully
consider this story in relation to the dialectic. Examining the story
against the dialectic (as outlined above) reveals problems of
consistency. This inconsistency reveals possible shortcomings of Plato’s
development of the dialectic. The extent of these shortcomings will be
elaborated on in the conclusion.
The dialectic, then, is at great odds with the allegory of the cave—when
the story is taken literally. First, there is no partnership forged in
turning the prisoner toward the light: another person releases the
prisoner from the chains. The absence of participation stands in contrast
to the need for participation in the dialectic. Furthermore, there is no
appearance of equality in this context because a hierarchy exists between
the prisoner and the non-prisoner. Second, since any type of dialogue
looks to be absent from the story, questioning the truthfulness of common
opinion does not occur. Third, critical reflection is not evident since
the discussion of common views does not happen. Last, the connection of
ideas by the prisoner seems unlikely since the other aspects of the
dialectic are not met. In short, the allegory of the cave informs us that
a prisoner is liberated by another person, forced to turn his body around,
and dragged out of the cave to see the light. Once out of the cave, the
prisoner perceives reality completely alone. Thus, the allegory is the
opposite of dialectical; it reveals a coercive method in which reality and
liberation are realized through physical force.
To understand this in more concrete terms, consider the reaction Karl Marx
would have received from a worker had he followed the method described in
the allegory of the cave. After dragging the worker out of the factory
and into the visible structures of capitalism, the worker would be left to
see the structures of capitalism by herself. To be sure, there is a
slight chance that the worker would comprehend the structures of
capitalism and how those structures work to oppress and dominate her. A
more likely scenario is that the worker would not perceive capitalism’s
underpinnings and the effect that the structures have on her. Indeed, the
worker would rightly be upset at Marx’s presumptiveness in physically
dragging her from the factory for the sake of human emancipation!
In Book VII of The Republic, Plato makes an explicit reference to
the negative impact that coercion has on gaining knowledge. Socrates
tells Glaucon that education “should be presented to the mind in
childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of
education” (Plato 1991, 284).
Citing the lack of critical reflection produced, Socrates stresses,
“knowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind”
(p. 284).
The story of the cave, however, is not the only point in the book that
appears to be in conflict with the dialectic. An exchange between
Socrates and Glaucon demonstrates further inconsistency. In his dialogue
with Glaucon on the usefulness of arithmetic, Socrates states to Glaucon:
I wish you would share this enquiry with me, and say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ when I
attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this
attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic
is, as I suspect, one of them. (Plato 1991, 265)
There are two aspects to this passage that highlight the dialectic.
First, Socrates is asking Glaucon to be a partner with him in the
“enquiry.” Second, the purpose of this partnership is to clarify the
truthfulness of a hypothesis. Although initially it seems that Socrates
wants a thinking partner in this discussion, it turns out that a lame
partner is what he asks for. To simply reply “yes” or “no” to statements
made by Socrates is not participating in the dialogue in any meaningful
way. Though it can be inferred that if Glaucon were to disagree with any
of Socrates’ statements, Socrates would then ask Glaucon to further
explain his challenge, he specifically asks Glaucon to reply “yes” or “no”
which restricts Glaucon’s full participation in the discussion.
Considering that over the course of this particular discussion he responds
affirmatively to Socrates’ statements twelve times with no questions
asked, it appears that Glaucon took Socrates’ suggestion literally.
However, this is not the only problem with Socrates’ apparent use of the
dialectic in this passage. In this exchange, Socrates wants to clarify in
his “own mind... in order that we may have clearer proof.”
The question to be asked then is how do partners gain better understanding
by virtue of one person gaining clarity? Perhaps Socrates wishes to
transfer this knowledge to Glaucon? This cannot be the case because as
Socrates makes clear, such diffusion of knowledge is not likely if the
student is not participating. Remember, he ridicules those educators who
“say that they can put knowledge into the soul which was not there before”
(Plato 1991, 258). It appears that the purpose of this investigation is
for Socrates to clarify something for himself and to have a “yes-man” by
his side. Neither the story of the cave nor the above passage is
indicative of the dialectic that was outlined earlier. These are not the
only instances that find Plato’s use of the dialectic in The Republic
lacking. As Plato scholar Jim Rice points out:
[I]t is impossible to characterize much of the Republic as a
genuine debate in which speech is pitted against speech. In stretches of
the text that go on for pages, the other participants’ contributions
consist only of ‘Yes,’ ‘Certainly,’ ‘That’s right,’ ‘We should agree to
that,’ and so forth... Socrates becomes more of a teacher, if not a
preacher, than an interlocutor on a par with the other characters [after
Book I]. (Rice 1998, 27)
Again, this inconsistency with the dialectic has implications for those
wishing to employ the dialectic. The conclusion of this paper will
analyze those implications. Having pointed to some inconsistencies in
Plato’s ideas about the dialectic and his actual use of it, an examination
of passages from Book I will look at more consistent uses of the
dialectic.
Search for Justice (Book I)
Though the allegory of the cave does not appear to represent
the dialectic as it has been identified in this paper, the discussion of
justice in Book I seems more attuned to it. This exchange includes his
interlocutors asking questions, making assertions, answering his questions
with more than simple “yes” and “no” responses, and offering a variety of
opinions. This stands in contrast to the analysis in the previous
section. The differences between Book I and other sections in The
Republic have not gone unnoticed by scholars. Some believe that this
difference can be attributed to Plato writing the first book earlier in
his life and then adding it to The Republic, which is considered as
part of his middle works. Others, however, suggest that “Plato’s shift
after Book I represents a criticism of the historical Socrates” (Rice
1998, 28). This could stem from “Plato’s criticism of Socrates’ method of
philosophizing” which runs the risk of bearing little or no fruit in the
pursuit of truth (Rice 1998, 29). This opinion sees the culmination of
this critique of Socrates in his own assertion that he is no closer to a
definition of justice than when the enquiry began (p. 29). Whatever the
reason for the difference, such a discussion falls outside the focus of
this paper. What is relevant, however, is the difference in dialogical
methods, because it provides an opportunity to analyze two different
styles—one more in line with the dialectic, the other not—within The
Republic. The discussion of justice that unfolds in Book I reveals
several instances of the dialectical method at work. Reflecting on these
instances will help to identify certain strengths of the dialectic.
The discussion begins with Socrates questioning Cephalus on justice. He
asks, is justice simply “to speak the truth and to pay your debts—no more
than this” (Plato 1991, 19)? Socrates counters by offering a possible
exception to this definition of justice. Cephalus agrees that this is an
inconsistency that spoils his definition. At this point Cephalus, the
elder of the group, exits the conversation.
Although a short section, this initial conversation contains features of
the dialectic. First, it begins with a common opinion of justice. With
this step underway, Socrates is able to question the accuracy of the
opinion. With this question, he elicits critical reflection amongst the
discussants, who agree that such an opinion is not in all cases correct.
Additionally, this discussion includes active participants, since someone
other than Socrates has made the initial statement on justice. Already,
three of the four dimensions of the dialectic are at work. Furthermore,
the exit of Cephalus is telling. Since he is “so entrenched in
conventional views,” it is possible that Cephalus is weary of the
transformative method that Socrates is employing and decides it is best
not to be unsettled at such a late stage of life (Rice 1998, 29).
Finally, it is telling that Socrates does not force or compel Cephalus to
remain in the discussion. This is a marked difference from the allegory
of the cave’s description of a person being physically forced to “see the
light.”
The introduction of Thrasymachus into the discussion and his participation
in it offers a second point of analysis. Thrasymachus bursts into the
dialogue complaining of the muddled nature of the discussion. He demands
that the discussants “not only ask but answer” questions of justice (Plato
1991, 17). Socrates responds that they are genuinely pursuing the meaning
of justice, but that they are encountering difficulties. Socrates then
tells Thrasymachus, who is criticizing Socrates for not asserting his own
definition of justice, that he cannot possibly define the meaning of
justice. Socrates states, “[w]hy, my good friend… how can any one answer
who knows... just nothing... The natural thing is, that the speaker should
be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell what he
knows” (Plato 1991, 19).
This passage highlights three parts of the dialectic. First, Socrates
invites Thrasymachus into the discussion to pursue the nature of justice.
This is telling due to the hostile manner with which Thrasymachus enters
into the discussion. The dialectic seems to actually gain strength when an
antagonistic element is introduced. Second, Socrates equalizes himself by
claiming to know nothing. Third, Socrates asks Thrasymachus to provide
his definition of justice. Again, three of the four parts to the
dialectic are at play here. Socrates asks Thrasymachus to be an active
participant in the conversation; he put himself on at least an even par
with Thrasymachus, if not a lesser par; and he asks for a common opinion
of justice so that the group could critically reflect on the opinion
together.
The one aspect of the dialectic that has not been evident thus
far in the conversation is the connection of ideas for greater
understanding. After questions are posed to test the truthfulness of
Thrasymachus’ definition(s) of justice, the group makes an effort to
synthesize the ideas. The various responses to these probing questions
are linked together by Socrates to show the inconsistency with
Thrasymachus’ version of justice. Toward the end of Book I, Socrates
reviews what has been gained thus far in the inquiry of Thrasymachus’
justice. He states:
[W]e have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and
abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common
action... to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time
vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly
evil, they would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that
there must have been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them
to combine... (Plato 1991, 41)
Not only does he draw what they have discussed together in order to refute
Thrasymachus’ definition of justice, but Socrates continues further to
seek “whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust” (p.
41). Not wishing to end the discussion yet, he states, “I should like to
examine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the
rule of human life” (p. 41). In the final exchange of Book I, however,
Socrates concludes the discussion by claiming that they are no closer to
the “nature of justice” than when they began the inquiry (Plato 1991, 44).
Conclusion
The purpose of explaining the dialectic and analyzing when
Plato does and does not use it in The Republic is to gain a better
understanding of an important philosophical and educational concept and to
determine, on some level, what the dialectic can offer people now and in
the future.
Before the more positive elements of the dialectic are
considered, problems with the dialectic need to be addressed. It is
important to note, however, that these critical comments come nearly 3000
years after Plato wrote his dialogues, and thus, this author has the
benefit of an accumulation of knowledge that was not available to Plato.
Therefore, these remarks clearly fall outside the realm of immanent
critique. This is justified, though, because the discussion is shifting
outside of Plato’s era to contemporary times. Caveats aside, one problem
in particular needs to be addressed. Lacking in the conceptual framework
of the Platonic or Socratic dialectic is the notion of transference. This
is problematic for the theory of the dialectic. Before moving on,
however, a brief explanation of transference is necessary.
Though transference traditionally falls within the discourse of
psychoanalysis, the term is relevant for this discussion. For the
purposes of this paper, transference describes a relationship that sees
Person X “taking to heart” what Person Y says, even if it
represents a challenge to the thinking of Person X. Transference
influences the relationship in such a manner because Person X
thinks that Person Y has some knowledge, regardless of whether or
not this is true, from which Person X can benefit. Therefore,
statements made or questions posed by Person Y can pierce through
the long-held beliefs and habits of Person X. Sigmund Freud, most
famous for his thoughts on psychoanalysis, explained that an analyst’s
“interpretation is often only accepted in so far as the transference… has
conferred a special authority upon the analyst” (Laplanche and Pontalis
1973, 460). Without this “special authority,” the analyst has little
chance of convincing a patient that the Oedipus complex, for example, is
an important moment of human development.
The role of transference in relationships like those between
teacher-student or political organizer-community member is of utmost
importance here. Whether they realize it or not, any successful teacher
or organizer must establish transference, on some level, with the people
with whom she works. Transference establishes a level of trust that
underlies a willingness to listen to one another and learn. Transference
impacts all four of the components comprising the dialectic. The
establishment of transference, then, can determine whether or not the
dialectic will work.
Why is transference crucial for the discussion of the dialectic that is
drawn from The Republic? The absence of discussion about
transference is what creates difficulties. If the existence of
transference is primary to an effective pedagogical approach, then a
discussion of how to gain transference is crucial. Although the
dialectic, as described in The Republic, offers an element that
works to establish transference (the part that encourages active
participation and equal status in a discussion), it never addresses the
issue of transference. For this reason, the theory of the dialectic is
lacking.
If the dialectic is to be useful today, the issue of transference must be
included in the discussion. Frustration for users of the dialectic could
result if transference is not addressed. For instance, imagine that a
teacher follows the Socratic dialectical method in a classroom. But to
the teacher’s dismay, critical reflection on common assumptions does not
take place amongst the students. If the notion of transference is not
part of the teacher’s conceptual framework, he may blame the students or
the method for the lack of results. In reality, the absence of
transference is to blame for the dialectic not working. Transference
provides the trust and rapport in the teacher-student relationship which
allows the teacher and student to engage in critical reflection of
societal conventions.
This frustration is understandable since Plato never suggests transference
in Socrates’ relationship with his young interlocutors. But it is clear
that Socrates has established transference with his partners in inquiry,
for they clearly look to him for answers to their questions. How else
could he not only challenge the conventions of the young elites in
Athenian society but also “turn” them away from those very conventions?
The transference that Socrates establishes with his students poses a grave
threat to Athenian society and results in his trial and conviction for
“corrupting the youth of Athens.”
Additionally, as was pointed out previously, Socrates, as Plato portrays
him, does not always follow the form of dialectical inquiry himself. Much
of The Republic is a one-sided conversation starring Socrates.
However, this does not necessarily imply that his students were not
listening and critically reflecting on his ideas. Because transference
was established, dialogue was not the only method available for Socrates
to be effective. Believing that he had some knowledge that they needed
(despite his claims of ignorance), students were willing to critically
reflect on challenges to their thinking that Socrates presented. More
recently, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was able to make millions of people
critically reflect on common assumptions regarding race relations in the
United States during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. This was not
accomplished through millions of dialogues that Dr. King had with people.
Rather, he established transference with people, and was therefore able to
challenge long-held convictions about racial segregation and
discrimination.
Given that the dialectic appears to be in need of a concept like
transference, this is one of the more glaring weaknesses of the
dialectical method today. The issue of transference must be a part of the
discourse on the dialectical method. Those using the dialectical approach
must consider how transference is established and how the dialectic can
establish, maintain, and increase levels of transference. To be sure, the
dialectical method is lacking in other areas as well. Power relations
(based on gender, class, race, sexual orientation, and so forth) and
student and citizen apathy are areas that need to be addressed if the
dialectic is to be useful today. This analysis hopes to spark a dialogue
on these and other problems with the dialectic.
Much more can be said on the matter of transference, but the scope of this
discussion restricts us here. The utility of the dialectic for today must
be considered. While the omission of transference is a difficulty in the
theoretical framework, the dialectic still offers an important pedagogical
approach in raising critical consciousness in people. The dialectic
provides a model in which the “medium is the message.” Regardless of the
content that a person is learning, how he learns that content is as
important, if not more so, in determining what the person is going to
learn (Postman and Weingartner 1969, 18-19). With the dialectic then, the
form of learning includes questioning, critically reflecting on common
opinions, and pulling ideas and thoughts together. Therefore, this is
what people learn to do. This is in contrast to a lecturer telling people
to do such things as ask questions, critically reflect, and connect
ideas. Though lectures can be effective teaching tools when transference
is there, in the end, it is the practice of the dialectic that develops
critical thinking in people. For a democratic society, a fostering of
such critical thought is of crucial importance. Without citizens capable
of critical thinking, the practice of democracy is a hollow endeavor.
Thus, the dialectical method, while not perfect, offers a way of
furthering democratic culture and fulfilling the potential of democratic
ideals.
By examining the discussion of justice in The Republic, this paper
offers a glimpse of the value that the dialectic offers a democratic
society. As the discussion with Thrasymachus demonstrates, the dialectic
can handle—indeed it thrives on—the introduction of multiple, and
contrary, points of view. An increased tolerance of ideas, a plurality of
voices, and increased confidence in civic participation can result from
engaging and employing the dialectical method. The discussion in Book I
also points to a method that allows common opinions to be constantly
evaluated for their accuracy, even when no one right answer can be found.
This is imperative for a democratic society. As John Dewey pointed out in
The Public and Its Problems:
[S]ince conditions of action and of inquiry and knowledge are always
changing, the experiment must always be retried; the State must always be
rediscovered… [P]olitical philosophy and science… [must] aid in [the]
creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less
at the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that men may learn from
their errors and profit by their successes. (Dewey 1954, 34)
The dialectical method helps realize Dewey’s vision. Though problems
exist both theoretically and practically with the dialectic, it provides
the potential to develop citizens who are able to constantly challenge the
status quo and suggest new ideas based on those challenges.
Hopefully this discussion has shown that the dialectic remains
a valuable pedagogical approach for furthering democratic ideals of active
and critical participation in civic life. This author certainly feels
that it is. However, the concept of transference must become part of
contemporary considerations of the dialectic. The dialectic must be open
to constant critique and suggestion. Ensuring that the dialectic can
resist unequal power relations that exist in society and any further
hindrances to open and free dialogue requires that the dialectic be open
to such criticism.
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