The Impact of Immigration on Danish Politics:
The Rise of Populism and the Fall of Social
Democracy
Eric Pytel & Kristanna Roper
DePaul University
cevric@aol.com &
kristannar@yahoo.com
Spring 2002
Abstract
Perhaps the most volatile current issue in
Denmark is immigration and its impact upon Danish society and politics.
The Danish population is incredibly homogenous. Only 7.3% of the
population is composed of either immigrants or citizens of non-Nordic
descent. While the rate of immigration has remained relatively steady
throughout the past twenty years, it soared in 1995: over 40,000
immigrants settled in Denmark in 1995 alone, many of them coming from less
economically developed countries like Sri Lanka, Somalia, and Ethiopia.
The political ramifications of these developments, which are still
unfolding, have been tremendous. This paper explores the rising force of
anti-immigration sentiments in Danish political discussions since the
early 1990s. Our specific focus concerns the effect of growing
anti-immigrant sentiments amongst some elements of the citizenry upon
political party behavior within the Danish assembly, the Folketing. Have
the policy positions of the major parties in Danish politics been affected
by this increasingly important ideological/policy dimension? What has
been the impact upon the process of coalition formation and the
traditional coalition partners? These are the questions studied in this
paper, where particular attention will be directed at the major player in
Danish politics, the Social Democratic party.
Prepared for presentation at the Tenth Annual Illinois
Conference for Students of Political Science, Illinois State University,
Normal, Illinois, April 4, 2002.
Introduction
“We shall work with each other and against each other: that is
parliamentarism’s strange and necessary paradox” (Poul Schluter quoted in
Miller 1996, v).
The Danish parliamentary system is host to over ten political parties in
any given election during the past ten years. Denmark’s political model
is characterized by extensive dominance from four core parties that
utilize the remaining smaller parties to gain the necessary electoral
support needed to control the Folketing. Thus, “the balance of power
is…fundamentally important” (Aylott 1999, 97) and can be jeopardized by
issues both intrinsic to the Danish model and by peripheral issues that
receive an unnecessary amount of political attention. We argue that the
latter primarily influences coalition formation within the current Danish
system.
Our focus in this paper will be upon immigration, which has become a
contentious dividing line between Denmark’s left and right political
axes. The issue of immigration has impacted both party coalitions and
voter perceptions as to what is vital in the Danish political agenda. The
volatility of the issue, caused in part by the Danish People’s Party (DPP)
on the far right, has resulted in the party gaining electoral support, as
well as influencing the subsequent decline of the Social Democratic party
on the left. In this paper, we will explore the political, social, and
economic situations in Denmark that were conducive to generating and
sustaining the influx of anti-immigration rhetoric that provided the DPP
with a conduit to access Denmark’s political stage and become a viable
political actor. The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of
immigration within the Danish political system, specifically focusing on
the impact it has had on the coalition formation process and the rise and
fall of two of Denmark’s important political parties. Several components
of this study will include: a basic understanding of Denmark’s political
and social structures, institutions, and political actors; a comprehensive
history and analysis of the rise of immigration as a salient political
issue; and an extensive exploration of immigration implications on
coalition formations and policy initiatives.
The Folketing
It is important to understand the structure of the current Danish
government in order to understand the coalitional nature of political
parties and thus the effects of current issues on the coalitional nature.
The current unicameral legislative assembly, the Folketing, is relatively
new and has existed only since 1953. There are 179 Folketing seats: 135
are proportionally elected within single constituencies, 40 are filled on
the basis of the overall proportion of votes a party receives, and 2 are
filled from proportionally-elected independent elections in Greenland and
the Faroe Islands. Elections are mandated every four years, but the Prime
Minister (with a minimum three-week notice) may call early elections. A
2% threshold is the established minimum percentage of the votes that a
party must receive to acquire representation in the Folketing (Siaroff
2000,
226).
Political Parties
Any discussion of Danish politics must address the proliferation of
political parties, as the “Scandinavian party systems are multiparty
systems characterized by an increase in the number of parties in
elections” (Sundberg 1999, 223). Throughout Denmark’s history one party
has maintained an apparent dominance by consistently controlling a
significant portion of the vote. The Social Democrats have, up until just
this past election on Nov. 20, 2001, received the highest percentage of
the votes in every election, peaking in 1935 with 46.6% of the vote (Esping-Anderson
1985, 77).
For the sake of this paper, it is important to know that the current
Social Democrats are decidedly split over the issue of immigration; one
side favors, in collusion with the right-wing parties, tighter immigration
laws, the other favors better integrative measures (O’Rourke 2002; Bering,
2001). The Liberal party has always been a veritable threat to Social
Democratic rule, and this past November they overtook the long-held Social
Democratic electoral dominance by receiving a plurality of the vote.
While not virulently anti-immigrant, the Liberals campaigned on a
determinedly anti-immigration platform (“Denmark set” 2002). Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, the head of the Liberal party and current Prime Minister,
declared, “Denmark must not be the social security office for the rest of
the world,” seemingly qualifying the party’s position (“Denmark Shifts”
2001, A6).
The Danish People’s Party is the newest face in Danish politics, first
making an appearance in the Folketing in 1998. Headed by Pia Kjaerssgaard,
the party’s main and only focus is an outright anti-foreigner platform,
and their actions in conjunction with their platform have been called
“distasteful” and “vindictive” by the major political players in Denmark (Isherwood
2001). Other parties with Folketing representation are: Unity list,
Socialist People’s Party, Radical Liberals, Christian People’s Party, and
the Conservatives.
Immigration: A Salient
Issue
Immigration as a salient social and political issue gained increased
scrutiny during the 1970s partly as an offshoot of the rising Populist
Party movements in Europe. The populist parties of Norway, Denmark, and
later on Sweden were pivotal in generating the eventual perception that
immigration was a growing regional issue.
In the wake of anxieties over the European Union membership referendum of
1972, Europe found itself in an intense political climate, marked by
stratified cleavages which included concerns over EU integration affecting
the national culture of many countries (Betz and Immerfall 1998). In
Denmark, the right-wing populist party, the Progress Party, seized the
opportunity to be an anti-establishment party that was strongly anti-EU
integration (Betz and Immerfall 1998).
During the election of 1973, the Progress Party was able to take advantage
of the turbulent political climate to garner 16% of the vote in its first
election campaign (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 85).
The anti-establishment purpose of the populist parties eventually shifted
towards other areas like immigration, becoming “the first two parties in
their respective systems to address the immigration issue in strongly
negative terms” (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 84). Immigration was portrayed
as either having consequences economically on the welfare state or
cultural ramifications that would generate societal conflicts (Betz and Immerfall 1998). In response, the progress parties advocated “a reduction
of allowed immigrants, as well as encouraging further integration within
society, deportation of those that commit crimes, and repatriation for
those with native countries that have stabilized” (Betz and Immerfall
1998, 84). The negative view towards immigrants has historical roots that
suggest that “native populations have often looked upon new arrivals with
a mixture of apprehension, suspicion, and disdain” (Betz 1994, 70).
Whether or not immigration is necessarily a reasonable concern within
Danish society and politics is questionable. To paint a picture of
Denmark using only the colors of its inhabitants’ skin, one would find
very little color. Denmark, like its Nordic neighbors, is virtually
homogeneous. Only 7.4% of the Danish population are citizens of a
non-Nordic descent (1.6%) or immigrants (5.8%) (Agerskov and Bisgaard,
2001). While a small figure at just approximately 400,000 people, this
number signifies a relatively sharp increase in the loss of homogeneity in
the past thirty years, as in 1970, immigrants or descendants were less
than 1% of the entire population (“Denmark set” 2002). What may perhaps lend
the most recent influx of immigrants distinction is that they are “quite
visibly recognizable” with “a distinctive race, religion, and culture,”
many immigrating to blonde-haired blue-eyed Denmark from Morocco, Somalia,
sub-Saharan Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, the Arab world, and the
Far East (Berdichevsky 2001, 138).
In the past ten years, especially, Denmark has undergone the
most profound changes in its society. Though its borders were closed to
open immigration in 1973, Denmark operated on a “de facto”
immigration/refugee rule that permitted refugees to easily become Danish
citizens and further permitted foreigners to bring their family and/or
spouse to Denmark to become a citizen (“Denmark Shifts” 2001, A6). The
current Danish immigrant faces this policy, as many of the
refugees-turned-citizens have fled from countries avoiding the severe
persecution that comes along with civil wars and political instability.
For instance, in 1995, the Danish immigration statistics peaked at a
twenty-year high, permitting over 40,000 refugees and immigrants to join
society, at a time when the war in the Balkans sent millions of persecuted
people searching for a safe haven (Mousavizadeh 1995, 46). One strong
reaction to these immigrants is the treatment of them as “others”, as
Danish natives can identify “a man, woman, or child whose roots are
Balkan, whose language is Slav, and whose faith...is Muslim” (Mousavizadeh
1995, 46).
Though claims from populist politicians have throughout the past ten years
demanded sharper segregation, with many advocating refugee camps or
deportation, many claims fell on relatively deaf ears. The trend to
discriminate and force assimilation however has been increasing steadily.
Spawning massive media attention and political debates, in 1999 a Muslim
14-year-old girl was denied an internship at a department store because
she wore headscarves. Following the hype, 56% of Danes agreed that
privately owned industries and businesses should have the right to forbid
their employees from wearing headscarves despite the religious
significance of the headscarves in the Muslim faith (“Europe: Testing”
1999).
Later that same year, riots broke out in Copenhagen after a Danish-born
man of Turkish descent was given an order of expulsion by the courts as
punishment for committing violent theft (“Europe: Danes” 1999).
In the aftermath of September 11, the reality that Denmark’s largest
minority is Muslim has directly affected the Danish citizenry’s perception
of Danish “others” even more extremely (Kokin 1996); currently, two-thirds
of all Danish natives support tightening or halting immigration into
Denmark (Juhl and Vennekilde 2001). Such a reality has no doubt been
shaped by vocal populist-party leaders, who, grasping the market to prey
on formerly non-existent “Danish nationalist” identity fears, have run ads
reading, “By the time you retire, Denmark will be a majority-Muslim
nation,” next to pictures of blonde-haired Danish children (Karacs 2001).
The social reality of immigrants unfortunately provides little
ammunition against immigration backlash. A study conducted by the Catinet
Institute and the University of Copenhagen found that immigrants and
refugees in Denmark typically have poorer jobs, lower wages, and
“considerably worse living conditions and housing than their Danish
compatriots” and that despite the fact that their standard of living goes
up as the immigrants live in Denmark longer, “foreigners never achieve the
higher level of affluence of the Native Danes” (“Immigrants fill” 2001).
Political scientist Fleming Mikkelsen observes, “Refugees and immigrants
find themselves in a situation characterized by extreme marginalisation,
both economic, social, political, and cultural” (“Immigrants fill” 2001).
Their somewhat subordinate position is further illuminated in the fact
that refugees and immigrants in the past ten years have generally lived in
tight-knit, low-income communities in and around Copenhagen. In Ishoj, a
suburb of Copenhagen, the immigrant and descendent population from less
developed countries is five times greater than the national average (Agerskov
and Bisgaard 2001). One proposed reason for the immigrants’ stratified
position in Danish society is that, typically, immigrants “are not
welcome” in the job market ("Refugees head" 2002).
Not unlike other European Union countries, Denmark “has
already experienced one episode of mass migration, which has still not
ended” (Coleman 1992, 457), fueled by the need for skilled laborers.
“Since the 1970s there was a steady decline in the proportion of European
immigrant workers, while at the same time the number of workers from Asia
and Africa increased considerably” (Betz 1994, 72). It was during this
same period, too, that Turkish, Pakistani, and Yugoslavian “guest workers”
were brought in to fill a void in the Danish system. Since closing its
borders to “guest workers” in the mid-1970s, though, the outlook for
employment for these immigrants has been bleak. The proportion of
immigrants in the job market is very low; with immigrant unemployment
levels three times that of native Danish citizens. Danish political
commentator Jakob Neilson explains, “You hear stories about highly
educated people from Iran, Afghanistan, from Turkey and Pakistan who leave
Denmark because they are unable to perform as doctors or dentists or
information technology experts” (O’Rourke 2002). Part of this problem
rises from the “political arrogance” of the Danish system, in which the
belief was that “one can simply transplant people from very different
parts of the globe and expect them to become instant Danes” (Bering
2001). When this immediate assimilation did not occur, despite
integration efforts, the result is disillusionment and a fear or animosity
towards foreigners that leads to the very stratification that we see today
(Bering 2001). This disillusionment is in part evident in that recently,
the former Danish Minister of Social Affairs, Karen Jespersen, explained
that Denmark “rejects the notion that the country needs to import
manpower” to fill the new void left from workers reaching pension age,
claiming, “the Danish government does not believe that this need can be
fulfilled by accepting more immigrants” (Knowles 2000).
Immigration: Myths and
Media Hype
The egalitarian notion of a multicultural society makes good
sustenance for political rhetoric, but in the Danish system the reality is
far from such a noble ideal. Not only does Denmark’s homogeneity lend
itself to cultural tensions, but also there seems to be a drive towards
assimilation of immigrants based on the idea that “let the immigrants be
any colour, but let them think and act like decent Danes” (“A centre
right” 2001, 51). In some ways the anti-immigration rage was a
Scandinavian-wide phenomenon, as evident in the “common manifesto that was
adopted at Oslo in 1993, that declared, ‘A defense against this takeover
of power (by immigrants) is both possible and valid’” (“The Nordic
Anti-Immigrant League” 1999, 16).
The media has impacted the perception that immigration is so pervasive and
problematic that it has become a concern for every Danish citizen. There
is a belief that the media has in many ways played more than just a minor
role: “It is the media’s focus on immigration that determines the success
of the anti-immigration parties” ("The Nordic Anti-Immigrant League” 1999,
16).
The more the media focuses on the issue the greater the effects it has on
the Danish citizenry: “As media focuses on immigration issues, there is a
perception that it is reflecting public opinion, this in turn gets
politicians going which in turn provides more ammunition for the media,”
according to Lise Togeby, political science professor at Arhus University
(“The Nordic Anti-Immigrant League” 1999, 16).
Often the immigration issue has contained a degree of ambiguity, as
citizens are unsure what role immigrants must play within Danish society.
Politicians have not helped to lessen immigration fears. Instead,
politicians have been a source of many of the more contentious and
volatile statements and positions on the immigration debate. Among the
most vociferous on the subject is Mogens Glistrup, the outspoken Progress
Party founder who claims, “All Muslims should be rounded up into camps,
and the women sold to South American countries” (“Europe: Danes,” 1999).
Another of the vocal politicians is Pia Kjaersgaard, head of the
right-wing Danish People’s Party, who told Swedish television, “I think
people are frightened by the number of immigrants in Denmark. The people
who vote for us want to send the immigrants back to where they came from”
(“Anti-Immigration Party” 1997).
Less volatile statements that have anti-immigrant appeal were made by the
current Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who said, “We are
facing a lot of unsolved problems with immigrants in Denmark” (“Danish
Opposition” 2002).
The media’s influence reverberated through the Danish electorate when “two
days before the 2001 election, the country’s largest newspaper (Morgenavisen
Jyllands-Posten), published a three-page long article about social fraud
among some Lebanese refugees allegedly receiving Danish social security
and working in Lebanon” (Anderson 2001, 6).
The article is believed to have resulted in nearly a complete loss of
voters for all of the immigration-friendly parties except the Radical
Liberals (Anderson 2001). Just prior to the 2001 election a portion of
Danish intellectuals and artists decided to fight back against the
anti-immigration rhetoric by taking out “advertisements in newspapers and
on the internet warning Danes against voting for a right-wing government
claiming, ‘the party has a repulsive view of human nature,’ and ‘threatens
values like justice and freedom of mind’” (Juhl and Vennekilde 2001).
While the current immigration realities and the extent to which they are
exaggerated in the media obviously affects the voter perceptions of
immigration as an ensuing substantive political matter, “how members of
receiving societies come to think and feel about immigration is
necessarily tied to changes in their country’s political and economic
policies specific to the new entering members of their respective
societies” (Jackson, Brown, Brown, and Marks 2001, 456). In concordance
with our argument, the Danish People’s Party and the current wave of
immigration fears are less tied to actual problematic realities than to a
snowball effect whereby immigration concerns (a peripheral issue in the
larger scheme of Danish politics) are elevated by a political party,
essentially for its own political advancement, and then must be addressed
on a national level in accordance with the level of hype the issue was
able to garner.
Proposed Immigration
Initiatives
The proposed immigration initiatives would serve to stratify Danish
society even further. The Government’s policies “rest on three
fundamental considerations”: “international conventions must be honoured”;
restrictions must be placed on the amount of immigrants coming in
conjunction with requirements enforcing their “duty to support
themselves”; and current Danish-residing immigrants “must be better
integrated and get a job faster” (“A new policy” 2002). While the
fundamental elements of the “foreigner policy” seem relatively innocuous,
the specifications of the initiative bear the label “draconian” from some
critics (Isherwood 2001). Some controversial specifics of the immigration
package propose the following: no person under 24 years old may bring a
spouse into Denmark; “current access to family reunification with parents
over 60 years of age will be abolished”; family members of immigrants must
put up 50,000 krone ($6,000 U.S.) to insure against the immigrant
receiving full welfare benefits; a command of the Danish language, both
written and spoken, along with knowledge of the Danish society, principles
of laws, and values are required, and must be tested; foreigners can “only
obtain a permanent residence permit after seven years,” increasing from
the current required three-year waiting period; and immigrants convicted
of serious crimes may be repatriated (“A new policy" 2002).
These policies directly reflect the powerful position of the Danish
People’s Party and its influence on the ruling coalition that they are
part of, as many of the stipulations of the policy coincide directly with
the Danish People’s Party’s platform (Isherwood 2001), and are milder
assertions of the Danish People’s Party’s own ideal policies, which
include “repatriating Somali refugees by dropping them in parachutes over
the Horn of Africa” (Bjugan 1999, 174), and deporting “any person
convicted of a criminal offense,” along with “that person’s entire family”
(Came 2000, 32). Initiatives are to be brought to the Folketing within
this year, and integrative measures are not expected to be developed until
fall (O’Rourke 2002).
Ruud Koopsman proposes an opportunistic model to explain the rise of
racist and extreme violence that seems to succinctly describe the rise of
immigration fears and subsequent political ramifications in Denmark. In
this model, “objective conditions such as the presence of foreigners and
the influx of refugees will only come to be a social problem and an issue
on the political agenda if they are defined and interpreted as such by
political elites” (1996, 201). Thus, though “objective conditions”
increase (as they so have done in Denmark), the issue will only become
serious enough to be put on a political agenda if “political elites choose
to problematize given state of affairs,” often “for a variety of other
reasons than objective pressures” (Koopsman 1996, 201). Obviously, in the
case of Denmark, the concrete problems caused by immigration have not yet
spiraled out of control, and there is little possibility that unaltered,
they will actually do so. While stable in reality, the situation has been
seemingly blown out of proportion by politicians and the media and has
even started to cause immigration-discrimination effects that that would
in fact be linked to objective conditions (immigrant unemployment).
To alleviate the newly created problem of immigration to
prevent far-right violence, “politicians must act swiftly and effectively
on the concerns they have helped to stir, for instance by introducing
restrictive legislation with regard to immigration and refugees” (Koopsman
1996, 201). In Denmark, the fervor has been manifested in the growing
popularity and parliamentary strength of the Danish People’s Party and
immigration policies that reflect the ideals of the party, rather than an
increase in violence towards foreigners. However, as a result, the issue
has saturated political discourse and invariably shaped not only the
policies but also the formation of coalitional governments within the
Folketing.
Understanding Coalitions
Throughout the course of our study thus far, we have explored
the structure of the Danish political system, the relevant political
actors, and the situation of immigrants in the Danish society. We also
have examined the inaccurate depiction of the current immigration
situation by the Danish People’s Party used to generate immigrant fears
through the use of various political tactics. Immigration was portrayed
as a pressing political issue that stands to alter the shape of Danish
politics. Next, we will explore coalitional theories and assess the
degree to which the Danish People’s Party has succeeded in making
immigration a policy that defines Denmark’s political structure.
Coalition theory seeks to examine the many factors that affect
coalition formation. Some of the integral factors: “historical,
ideological, policy, personality and leadership, political perceptions,
and tactical choices - have hampered or inhibited party cooperation and
hence coalition formation” (Miller 1996, 222). Coalition theory is a
multi-faceted concept that broadly defines what tendencies lend towards
coalition building. For the purpose of this study we will only discuss
theories of policy-based coalition formation. In this study immigration
is the policy issue explored. On a polar scale, coalition theory often
entails political parties that are nearest one another in terms of
ideological similarities, uniting in an alliance. Kenneth Miller however,
defines a coalition as existing if three conditions are present: “a
Government is to be formed, following a general election, parliamentary
defeat of a previous government; there are several parties seeking to
participate in such a Government or with an interest in determining which
other parties participate; and some or all of the parties believe they can
gain more of what they want by agreement and through coordinating their
efforts than by acting alone” (Miller 1996, 36). Typically a coalition
entails the formation of an alliance between two parties: “Alliances have
been both formal and informal, with a minority cabinet relying upon more
or less steady assistance from one or several support parties
(‘parliamentary coalitions’)” (Miller 1996, 220). What classifies a party
as in agreement with another party requires an understanding of the idea
that parties can be categorized into pairs of either “agreeing” or
“disagreeing” based on a specific policy issue (Laver and Budge 1992, 15).
Most coalitions fall into one of two categories: “the first group
compromises theories that predict that parties closest to each other in
policy terms will form coalitions”; and “[t]heories in the second group
base themselves on pure policy considerations and emphasize strategic
considerations deriving from the overall configuration of the policy
space” (Budge and Laver 1993, 501).
A crucial concept to further understand coalition theory is
the idea of a policy space. The most common representation of policy
space is the traditional “left-right socioeconomic” dimension (Laver and
Budge 1992, 16). This places parties respective to their policy
differences on a theoretical scale that has equality and justice on the
left, and individualism on the right. Party positions are often
formulated along the traditional polar scheme: “an actor strives to bring
about a winning coalition in which he is included, and which he expects to
adopt a policy that is as close as possible…to his own most preferred
policy” (Budge and Laver 1993, 500). However, it is important to note,
“party policy positions are liable to change over time” (Laver and Budge
1992, 16).
Policy positions of government can be analyzed by examining the policy
positions of a government’s respective parties (Laver and Budge 1992).
Coalition theory also illustrates that the “link between party policy and
government policy is central because it helps to make sense of the process
of coalition bargaining” (Budge and Laver 1993, 499).
Traditional Coalition partners
Coalition building has been a trademark of the Danish political system.
“The era of coalition politics had begun for Denmark in 1909. With no
party able by itself to capture a majority of parliamentary seats, every
Government since then has had to rest upon some kind of alliance” (Miller
1996, 220). Prior to the 1970s, Denmark was basically a three party
system: social democratic parties, conservative parties, and agrarian
parties (Sundberg 1999), and “[a]fter 1973 even three-party coalitions
proved difficult or impracticable to form; and a majority of cabinet and
parliamentary coalitions since 1973 have been four-or five-party
combinations” (Miller 1996, 220; Sundberg 1999, 222).
There are three types of government that may form subsequent to an
election: majority coalition, minority coalition, and single party
(majority or minority). A majority coalition is formed when the party in
the cabinet and its support parties together have a legislative majority
(Miller 1996). Such coalitions formed in 1945 (the National coalition),
1957-1960 (Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Justice Party), 1960-1964
(Social Democrats, Radical Liberals), 1968-1971 (Conservatives, Liberals,
and Radial Liberals), and 1993-2001 (Social Democrats, Radical Liberals,
Centre Democrats, Christian People’s Party), 2001-current (Liberals,
Conservatives, Danish People’s Party) (Damgaard 1994). Minority
coalitions occur when the party and the cabinet and its support parties
together, lack a legislative majority (Miller 1996). Minority governments
formed in 1950-1953 (Liberals and Conservatives), 1978-1979 (Social
Democrats and Liberals), 1982-1988 (Conservatives, Liberals, Center
Democrats, and Christian People’s Party), 1988-1990 (Conservatives,
Liberals, and Radial Liberals), 1990-1993 (Conservatives and Liberals) (Damgaard
1994).
Due to the nature of minority coalitions, “sometimes, without consistent
support, a minority Government has had to search for shifting
issue-to-issue, parliamentary-vote-to-parliamentary-vote majorities, or to
hope for other parties’ tolerance and forbearance, or their distaste for
an immediate election” (Miller 1996, 220). Single party governments are
non-coalitional in nature and, in minority situations, have a single party
cabinet that “lacks a parliamentary majority of its own and has no support
parties” (Miller 1996, IV). Some coalitions are built via historical
familiarity with another party: “Parties are likely to find it easier to
form a coalition similar to a previous one, rather than seeking a new
arrangement, if the earlier experience has been fairly happy” (Miller
1996, 225). Other coalitions are never made because of apprehension
regarding an accommodation to the point of compromising a party’s own
identity: “A party might decide that staying out of a coalition served its
interests better than joining one” (Miller 1996, 236).
Current Coalition Discussion
The Danish system doesn’t appear to offer the Danish People’s Party any
motivation to continue to push the anti-immigration issue any further
after obtaining parliamentary representation and shaping coalitional
formation. On the surface it would seem that the immediate gain of making
immigration the basis of policy-based coalition formation had been
achieved with the replacement of the Social Democratic coalition by the
Anti-immigration friendly, Liberal/Conservative coalition. Despite the
fact that the Danish People’s Party was not officially integrated into the
ruling Liberal/Conservative government, a payoff still existed: “It is
possible, indeed, for a party to receive high policy payoffs, in the sense
that the government adopts policies close to the party’s ideal policies,
while it none-the-less remains outside the government” (Budge and Laver
1993, 514). Consequently, the immigration issue is kept as a salient
political issue, to the approval of the Danish People’s Party.
Politically, Denmark has a high degree of party cohesion.
Ozbudun defines party cohesion as an “objective condition of unity of
action among party members” (Skjaeveland 1999, 121). The basic premise of
party cohesion is that Danish voters punish MPs that break away from
voting along party lines. Danish voters have some degree of electoral
pull: “even though the electoral system is one of proportional
representation, voters can vote for an individual candidate within a
party” (Skjaeveland 1999, 124). Party cohesiveness is important in
policy-based coalitions in that it prevents party members from straying
too far from their respective party’s ideological platforms.
Anti-immigration is linked strongly to the Danish People’s Party and
despite the lack of a representation in the new Liberal/Conservative
regime the party is able to remain viable partly due to party cohesion,
which keeps members from breaking ranks, and partly due to the inherent
coalitional nature that required the Liberal/Conservatives to seek the
Danish People’s Party’s support.
On the other side of the spectrum, the Social Democratic party
suffered huge losses during the November 20, 2001 election. The
immigration issue was at the forefront of the debate, perhaps due to the
“lack of other problems, the fact that immigration has never been taboo in
the Danish media, and by the presence of a right-wing party” (Anderson
2001,
6). After years of changes by the Social Democrats to the immigration and
refugee laws it was apparent that “19 law changes in six years” failed to
appease the Danish electorate of their concerns over immigration (Ohlin
2001). It became increasingly apparent that the Social Democratic calls
for a “more ‘humane’ refugee policy and better integration of immigrants
in Danish society appeared to have fallen on deaf ears” (Ohlin 2001). The
fall of the Social Democrats was so dramatic that between the spring and
winter of 2001 opinion polls showed a “precipitous drop from 35.9% to less
than 20%” (Fallesen 1999, 21). The benefactors of the sudden decline were
the opposition Liberals who had their support reach a “historic 35%” (Fallesen
1999, 21).
In the wake of the electoral defeat the Social Democrats were forced to
reassess their immigration policy as “the Danish People’s Party had
adapted to the times by aiding in the passage of key social and welfare
issues” ("Overtures to" 2002). The disastrous misfortunes for the Social
Democrats left many of the party’s members calling for party leader Poul
Nyrup Rasmussen to resign. “And it isn’t just Nyrup who’s the problem,
we’ve had four people at the top for too many years,” said Frank Jensen, a
possible replacement candidate for Nyrup ("Call for ex-Premier" 2002).
Conclusion
Social Democracy, the vanguard of Danish politics for the
better part of the 20th century, fell off its bicycle. In its
place, the Liberals/Conservatives have formed a potent coalition with the
assistance of the rising Danish People’s Party, which captured “12% of the
vote in the 2001 election to become the third largest Danish party” (Bernbom
2002, 25). Denmark’s political system lends itself to coalition
formations due to the dominance of the social democrats, and the
parliamentary requirement of 90 seats in order to have a majority
coalition.
Denmark’s political scene has experienced the following: “In 41 coalitions
over a period of nearly 90 years, only 12 resulted in such winning cabinet
coalitions. In 12 coalition situations the outcomes were winning
parliamentary coalitions – that is, minority Governments supported by one
or more non-Government parties with no share in cabinet portfolios,
regardless of any other payoffs they may have received” (Miller 1996,
222).
The vibrancy of the Social Democratic party began to lose its luster by
the time the 1970s rolled around. Not only were right wing
anti-establishment populist movements popping up in Europe, but there was
also a growing sentiment that the “ordinary man” must be “represented
against his enemies which include politicians, bureaucrats and immigrants”
(Widfeldt 2000, 488). Anti-immigration became the anthem for these new
populist movements. The Danish People’s Party was able to create a general
state of panic and anxiety amongst the Danish electorate that the
perceived fear over immigration was greater than the reality. Strategic
use of the media by the DPP was essential to increasing the perception
that foreigners were both a social problem and a political dilemma that
resonated within every proud Danish citizen. The homogenous population in
Denmark made the sight of foreigners virtually unavoidable. Once believed
to be a tolerant and peaceful country, Denmark is now a virtual inferno
for immigrants and foreigners. The European phenomenon “suggests that
xenophobia and hostility to immigrants and asylum seekers are a key part
in the appeal of the populist right, but it isn’t the only issue; and
indeed not even always the most important” (Widfelt 2000, 498).
The Danish political system’s support “varies according to the
magnitude of the gap between what one wants the government to do and what
it is actually doing on a few critical issues” (Borre 2000, 306). In
Denmark a new era has begun, one that includes the “New Politics” issues
regarding “foreign aid, criminal justice, environmental protection, and of
course, immigration” (Borre 1995, 189).
We can only hope that the traditional values of a tolerant and just Danish
society will ultimately prevail, creating more of the utopian society that
many social democrats still dream about.
APPENDIX
Political Parties
Social Democrats (SD) 1871
-Pro social
spending
-Pro immigration
-Pro joining the EU/EMU
-Represents mostly industrial labor, advocates economic planning, full
employment, extensive social security benefits, and environmental
planning.
-Received a little over a third of the vote in 1990 and 1994 national
elections but was slightly less successful in subsequent European and
local elections.
-Party secured 36% of the vote in the March 1998 legislative balloting.
-Poul Nyrup Rasmussen prime minister from Jan. 1993- Nov. 2001; He has
also served as the head of the Social Democratic Party since 1992.
Liberal Party (V) 1876
-Agrarian and rural population constituency
-Traditional liberal position on economic policies
-Calling for further liberalization of the national economy
-Advocates more personal freedom
-Pro joining the EU/EMU
-Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the current Prime Minister of Denmark. He has
also been the head of the Liberal Party since 1998.
Radical Liberal Party (Social Liberal) (RV) 1905
-Less conservative members of Social Liberal Party
-RV supports traditional economic policies and gradually more supportive
of the EU in recent years.
-Support from intellectuals and small landholders.
-Joined/Endorsed SD-led governments
-RV is the “hinge” party-containing median MP in a left-right axis sense.
-Supported Schluter KF-led coalition in 1982.
-Awarded 5 cabinet posts in the Schluter 1988 government.
-Withdrew from formal participation in 1990.
-In Jan. 1993, it received three portfolios in the new center-left
coalition.
-In June 1994 European Parliament balloting, RV was the only government to
increase its vote share, from 3.5% in 1990 to 8.5% (gaining one EP seat)
-In Sept. national election it scored 4.6% (increasing its seat total from
7 to 8 and remained a part of the ruling coalition.
-RV lost one seat in the March 1998 election.
Conservative People’s Party (KF) 1916
-Represents financial, industrial, business groups
-Supports adequate defense; protection of private property;
sound fiscal policy
-Wants lower taxation
-(Under leadership of Poul Schluter the party recovered from a low of 5.5%
of vote in 1975 to 14.5% of the vote in 1981 enabling a center-right
coalition in 1982). Later the party surged to 23.4% (1984) followed by a
decline to 16% (1990) and resignation of Schluter in Jan. 1993.
-In the March
1998 election, KF lost 11 of its 27 seats.
-Despite
maintaining traditional center-right positions on social/economic issues
(i.e. lower taxation), they continue to support the welfare state.
(Small party) ANTI-EU Justice Party (JP)
-Founded in 1919 as the Single-Tax Party.
-Strongest during the 1940s and 1950s but since had only managed to win
representation in 3 elections
Socialist People’s Party (SF) 1958
-Formed out of a split in the Communist Party of Denmark (DKp) over the
party’s support of Soviet intervention in Hungary during 1956.
-Supports far left positions but independent of Moscow line.
-Party opposed to NATO/ EU
-Support comes mainly from disenchanted social democrats and left wing
intellectuals
-Unofficial left wing of SD {influences the SD platform and voting patterns
of the larger party}.
-Traditionally anti-EU, but the party was split at the Aug. 1997 congress
when parliamentary leader Steen Gade resigned his post in order to
campaign for ratification of the EU’s Amsterdam Treaty.
Left Socialist Party (VS) 1967
-Formed out of split from the Socialist People’s Party (SF)
-Achieved representation during 1968-1971
Christian People’s Party (KrF) 1970
-Opposes abortion and liberalization of pornography regulations.
-Support base is mainly religious groups and clergy.
Progress Party (FP) 1972 Right wing party
-A protest party with strong anti-tax platform.
-For the abolition of diplomatic service and the military.
-Argued for gradual but complete dissolution of personal
income tax in Denmark.
-Party founded by Mogens Glistrup who was convicted in Feb. 1978 of tax
evasion in the longest trial in Danish legal history. He was later
sentenced in 1983 to serve a 3-year prison term.
-Glistrup returned as the head of the party in the year 2000.
Centre Democrats (CD) 1973
-Formed by dissident Social Democrat Erhard Jakobsen
-Anti-taxation increases
-Oppose leftist tendencies of government (Giddens: Left/Right
distinction blurred)
-Involved in center-right coalition from 1982-88
-Joined SD government in 1993 before resigning over policy
differences in Dec. 1996
Red Green Unity List (EL) 1989
-Formed out of a coalition of 3 left wing/environmentalist groups: Left
Socialist Party (VS) {resulted from 1967 split in SF party}; Communist
Party of Denmark (DKp); the Trotskyist Socialist Worker’s Party.
-The Maoist Communist Worker’s Party of Denmark joined the coalition in
1991.
-Strongly oppose joining the EU and the Maastricht process.
-The Unity list in Sept. 1994 general election won 3.1% of the vote earning
them 6 seats in parliament.
-Led by a 21-person collective leadership group, no single individual
party leader.
-Unity lost 1 of 6 seats in March 1998 elections with vote share of 2.7%.
-Main goals: work for socialist democracy and towards solving
environmental problems facing Denmark/Europe.
-Anti-EU, based on idea that the EU is out to exploit the countries of
Eastern Europe.
Danish People’s Party (DFp) Oct. 1995
-Formed by dissident deputies from the right-wing
Progress Party (FP)
-Located to the right of the Progress Party
-Openly anti-immigration
-Anti-taxation
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