

Tacit Consent: The American News Media and Minority Tyranny

Morgan Weiland
Carleton College

Introduction

Tyranny of opinion in democracies is typically examined in relation to majority rule. However, political thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and more recently Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann have revealed that the tyranny of the majority is often a phenomenon reflecting minority opinion. Tocqueville provides a theoretical framework accounting for how minority rule may occur, yet the specific method by which a powerful minority shapes opinion— particularly the coincidental or intentional shaping of mass opinion through framing and priming— needs to be investigated through the lens of current American society. In the last decades of the twentieth-century, political scientists have further speculated that powerful political players may, wittingly or not, create the aura of public consensus by framing mass opinion to reflect the beliefs of a narrow segment of the public (Allen et al. 1994). Such incidental agenda-setting and shaping of opinion or even purposeful manipulation of mass opinion is hypothesized as more easily accomplished in a highly centralized institutional setting, returning to the source of Tocqueville's original conjectures about the character of mass opinion in an age of equality and administrative centralization (Allen 1991). Ultimately, these investigations will inform the question: how can powerful minority groups, specifically the government, control public opinion in American democracy today?

To examine this question, Tocqueville's work on tyranny of opinion is first investigated, through a comparison of his analyses of revolutionary America and France. Then the thematic thread between Tocqueville and Noelle-Neumann, who applied Tocqueville's ideas to a twentieth-century context, is explicated. After developing their models of minority tyranny, the current literature pertaining to the role of the media is assessed, specifically focusing on the media as an institution, and the agenda-setting, framing, and priming functions of the media. While the literature establishes one causal model of public opinion formation, I problematize the model and propose a new link in the causal chain. Specifically, as opposed to viewing the news media as the causal agent affecting public opinion formation through agenda-setting, framing, and priming, I argue that the government actually agenda-sets, frames, and primes for the news media, which in turn affects public opinion formation. To illuminate this causal relationship, an empirical test is conducted to reveal the degree to which the neoconservative minority opinion in the current Bush administration has been able to frame, prime, and agenda-set for the *New York Times*. Following is a description of the qualitative methodology, in which both Presidential speeches and *New York Times* articles from similar time periods were analyzed and coded.

Next is a presentation of the findings, which I argue support the hypothesis, and a discussion of the implications of the results concludes the work.

Tyranny of Public Opinion: Tocqueville's Insights

Alexis de Tocqueville was a lover of liberty and a sober critic of democracy, which he believed to be the most significant revolution of all time. He perceived an epic seven-hundred-year unfolding of this phenomenon, in which each phase brought humankind closer to a pure manifestation of democracy, defined as equality of social conditions (Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 2, 6-7). Through the lens of both the American and French revolutions, Tocqueville investigated democracy's fundamental elements, as well as revealed its inherent weaknesses. These vulnerabilities, implied through his observations of America and demonstrated by his study of the French Revolution, resonate in American politics in an era when the foundations of democracy are being threatened as Tocqueville suggested they might.

Tocqueville's America: Seeds of Sovereignty, Seeds of Tyranny

In order to understand the political culture of the Americans, it is necessary, according to Tocqueville, to examine the nation's point of departure. Tocqueville argued that the point of departure of a nation is the most important element that accounts for its character, as it renders each culture's circumstances contextualized and esoteric. He maintained that America's point of departure proves it to be an exceptional case in that its beginnings are recent and known (Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 28, 390). Self-consciously creating a society based on equality of conditions, the culture of the Puritans essentially shaped the American point of departure (Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 266-267). Puritans, a particular group of Reformed Protestants, are responsible for the covenant tradition in America. *Foedus*, Latin for covenant, lay the foundation for federal and modern federal institutions. As both Althusius and Ames, sixteenth-century foederal theorists whose work influenced the American Puritans, explained, "participation in the communication of justice was the most basic obligation to be assumed by autonomous moral beings that exercised consent in all things, including accepting the covenant offered by God" (Allen 2005, 133). As humans have willingly accepted the covenant offered to them by God, they likewise replicate this relationship in society through willingly accepting society's covenants, i.e. by voluntarily entering into associations. Essentially, covenant thinking informed the idea of social volunteerism through its religious roots. Further, the "moral theory of civic duty" inherent in covenant thinking, shaped the nature of volunteerism in American society, translating the moral obligation to God into a moral obligation to others in society on both a public and private level (Allen 2005, 135). This ethos shaped American political culture, inculcating the habits of "civic engagement, self-reliance, and political virtue," the essential mores that

Tocqueville so emphatically described as constituting the essence of the Americans (Allen 2005, 182).

The American political culture, in which the “public [was] engaged in solving its problems,” stressed the importance of participation and thus of being informed (Allen 2005, 138). People actively and freely participated in their political lives on a local level through associations, which Tocqueville described as “great schools, free of charge, where all citizens come to learn the general theories of associations” (Tocqueville [1840] 2000, 497). Associations encouraged the use of public reasoning, which together were particularly necessary as a “guarantee against the tyranny of the majority” (Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 183). Public reasoning was markedly different than the potentially tyrannical expression of popular or private opinions, as it “implied that principles and practices would be consciously adopted, articulated, and evaluated” (Allen 2005, 183). Not only was the scientific method of public reasoning far “superior to the vagaries of the climate of opinion,” but it moreover provided people with the opportunity to join together and create common action, combating the negative effects of individualism, alienation, and isolation (Allen 2005, 183).

Still, Tocqueville observed that “no guarantee against [the tyranny of the majority] may be discovered” (Tocqueville [1835] 2000, 242). The principle of equality encourages the “dogma of the republic,” namely that “the ‘people’ is always right,” enabling a fundamental threat to liberty, which Tocqueville named democratic despotism (Allen 2005, 165). Tocqueville’s logic runs as follows: as American political culture is centered on equality, individuals see themselves in relation to other individuals as equals, yet they feel that there is no impetus for obedience or admiration of others who are like themselves, while simultaneously feeling alienated from other individuals with whom they are not necessarily socially tied (Tocqueville [1840] 2000, 482-484). Further, these same individuals see themselves in relation to the mass of other individuals, i.e. public opinion, as insignificant. The majority, who are by democratic definition always right, consequently renders the individual isolated and helpless, impotent in the face of the majority’s will. This fear leads to a false salvation through submission to a caretaker government, in which power becomes concentrated and augmented (Tocqueville [1840] 2000, 661-665). This, Tocqueville cautions, is the path to democratic despotism. Although it may seem as if the Puritan’s volunteeristic and covenantal framework would be sufficient to combat the tyranny of the majority, Tocqueville argues that equality, by its very nature, leads in this dangerous direction. As people became increasingly equal, “democracy’s twin psychological effects, individualism and conformity,” grew, creating a society in which individuals were both alienated from others and powerless in the face of the majority (Allen 2005, 168). The oppressive centralized caretaker state seemed to be, at least to Tocqueville, inevitable.

*L'ancien Régime and the French Revolution:
Exit Local Liberties, Enter Tyranny of Public Opinion*

In the history of France, the fears that Tocqueville had about America concerning the tyranny of the majority and of public opinion were born out in a different manner, yet yielded the same result. Whereas in America equality of conditions served as the point of departure for its democratic revolution and was followed by centralization, the causal order in the French Revolution was reversed. Centralization, Tocqueville argued, was the point of departure for the French Revolution, which he contended began during *l'ancien régime* and gave rise to the fundamental mores shaping the course of the French Revolution. The centralization that had occurred during the old regime established conditions conducive to the tyranny of public opinion as well as powerful minority rule that were prevalent during the Revolution. A salient figure in Tocqueville's exploration of centralization is Turgot, a royal minister, who Tocqueville names "the father of centralization" (Tocqueville 1998-2001, 324). Turgot essentially helped to increase bureaucratic centralization through the reduction of local governance and participation. As Tocqueville explains, "To do good for the citizens without their participation is his theory..." (Tocqueville 1998-2001, 326). The increase in centralization and decrease in self-governance had a twofold effect.

First, the complete disconnection that most people experienced with their political world combined with their inability to participate in any real way in their own governance created a climate conducive to the tyranny of public opinion. Not only were the people poorly informed, thus developing ignorant and experientially baseless opinions, but the power of public opinion grew, as it was the people's only political recourse, superficial and unrealistic though it may have been. Opinions had once been based on some level of political experience connected to local governance. The province of Languedoc, for example, enjoyed much "provincial freedom...under the old regime," yet lost its freedom to the centralization of royal power (Tocqueville [1856] 1998-2001, 250). In Languedoc, there was an assembly of "important men... in which no official of the central government...could take part, and where annually the province's special interests were discussed freely and openly" (Tocqueville [1856] 1998-2001, 251). Further, the province paid for and executed many public works. Finally, the province had an extreme degree of freedom concerning royal taxes, of which it "had the right to raise a part" of, as well as raise taxes as it wished for paying its local expenses (Tocqueville [1856] 1998-2001, 251). Consequently, it spent an enormous amount on public works, using its local freedoms to benefit the local community. "The government and its ministers, however, looked at such special freedoms with a very jaundiced eye," and the centralization that they promoted came to destroy the very freedoms and habits that, according to Tocqueville, could have peacefully led to democracy (Tocqueville [1856] 1998-2001, 254). Instead, the experience of self-governance was stripped from the people, who no longer had a practical basis for their opinions. Essentially, "public opinion became a legitimate source of authority in an

institutional environment that offered the developing democratic political culture centralization in place of local liberty” (Allen 2005, 171). It is important to note that this effect permeated not only the poor, but moreover most classes of society. As Tocqueville explains, “Absolute power makes everyone deteriorate: the vulgar man in giving him the soul of servitude, and superior men in depriving their minds of the experience that freedom gives” (Tocqueville 1998-2001, 338). The force of centralization in France truly was equalizing, creating conditions in which the ignorant masses followed the experientially baseless political ideas of the literati. These factors, Tocqueville argued, led to the failure of the Constituent Assembly and to the Terror (Tocqueville 1998-2001, 118).

Further, as people lost their capacity for self-governance— a result of centralization and the consequent reduction of local governance— they were prepared for political tyranny (in this case, absolutism). “The habit acquired by the lower classes of seeing everything done by a single man, to expect everything from him and to obey his will in everything,” Tocqueville explained, was “preparation for the Revolution and for that which would follow it” (Tocqueville 1998-2001, 321). Ultimately, Tocqueville looked to the coalescence of these factors, namely the rise of centralization, decline of local liberties, and the tyranny of public opinion, to explain the ascendancy and power of Napoleon Bonaparte, demonstrating, much as he saw in America, how powerful minority rule is born from the democratic womb. Although the causal chain leading to the rise of Bonaparte was the opposite of that which Tocqueville observed in America, both led to the same result: democratic despotism.

The Ascendancy of the Minority: Tocqueville and Noelle-Neumann

Through the concerns that Tocqueville developed about the tyranny of the majority in America and the damaging effects that he saw it to have in France, he developed a theory of public opinion. Particularly through his observations on the turning tide of public opinion against the Catholic Church during the French Revolution, Tocqueville concluded that individuals develop opinions based on what they perceive to be the “popular standard (or coming fashion)” as opposed to what they actually believe (Allen 2005, 179). Essentially, individuals self-censor when they do not think that their opinions will be in the majority. Thus, those in the alleged minority silence themselves. Conversely, those who believe their opinions to be in the majority have their beliefs reinforced as the opposing idea is not voiced, and they become more confident and extreme in their point of view. This self-reinforcing cycle ultimately creates a public opinion that “may reflect no conscious consideration of issues at all” (Allen 2005, 180). More fundamentally, as the vast majority of the public is unsure of and unclear on the state of political society or the true prevailing opinion of the public, the minority has an opportunity to promote their ideas through the vehicle of “the overwhelming moral power of a democratic majority” (Allen 2005, 187). Thus the seeming “majority” view is actually, in many cases, the position of a minority.

Essentially, Tocqueville demonstrated that the tyranny of the majority had become a tool used by the minority to wield an unruly and uncanny level of political power.

This process has also been investigated in the past century by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, which she terms the spiral of silence. Like Tocqueville, Noelle-Neumann conceptualized the rule of public opinion in such a manner revealing that the tyranny of the majority can very easily be the rule of a minority, which she terms the spiral of silence. As Noelle-Neumann explains, the spiral of silence operates based individuals' ability to sense changes in the climate of opinion and to respond to these changes (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 62). When individuals experience feedback, hearing their opinion voiced to them by others or by the mass media—a measure of public opinion—they become more confident in their point of view and therefore express it (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 25-26). Conversely, “If people find no current, frequently repeated expression for their point of view, they lapse into silence; they become effectively mute” (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 173). Their silence is, Noelle-Neumann argues, due to individuals' “fear of isolation, fear of disrespect, or unpopularity” (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 62). The mass media plays a central role in this process, as it constructs reality as perceived by many people, and thus constructs their view of public opinion. As Noelle-Neumann explains, “what does not get reported does not exist,” demonstrating the fundamental agenda-setting function of the media (Noelle-Neumann 1984, 150, 153). Both Noelle-Neumann and Tocqueville demonstrate that it is possible—if not probable—that the dominant public opinion expressed in a democratic society is that of a minority. By combining their respective ideas with Timothy Cook's idea of media as institution, as well as by reconceptualizing the accepted views of agenda-setting, framing, and priming in relation to the media, we can build a model explaining how powerful minority groups can control public opinion in democracies.

Role of the Media: Literature Review

Media as Institution: Agenda-Setting by the Government

Conceptualizing the media as an institution not only provides a useful theoretical framework in which to understand the agenda-setting function of the media, but also illuminates the manner in which powerful minorities can dominate the public discourse and thereby shape public opinion. Political scientist Timothy Cook argues that the institutional nature of the media creates embedded biases in its functioning. Cook outlines the central components of the media's institutional nature.

The news media is an institution, Cook explains, as it functions based on “unspoken procedures, routines, and assumptions” (Cook 2005, 71). This system creates an environment in which journalists make choices that are “implicit in the routines they follow rather than explicit;” for example, they look to other news sources to determine what is

news, they “go where the news is expected to happen, they rely on sources in a position to know, [and] they assemble the resultant bits and bites of information into a coherent and satisfying account” (Cook 2005, 73).

Further, the news is an institution because it has “endurance over time and extension across organizations” (Cook 2005, 76). All newsmakers are affected by three elements: the political environment, professionalism, and uncertainty. Concerning the political environment, Cook explains that the news media rely on “official sources to benefit from information subsidies, which gives them all a similar reliance on political power” (Cook 2005, 76). Additionally, all journalists are held to the same professionalism standards of objectivity and impartiality. Finally, and perhaps most important among the three, is the uncertainty that permeates journalism “over what is news, who makes news, and how to produce it” (Cook 2005, 78). Uncertainty leads to pack journalism, the desire to stay in line with the reporting of other journalists for fear of straying from the ‘right’ interpretation of events, and pool journalism, in which journalists rely on one another for stories so as to reduce uncertainty. Both pack and pool journalism lead to homogeneity of coverage, minimal risk-taking, and a generally limiting perspective on news.

Finally, Cook argues that the relationship between the government and journalists further institutionalizes the news media. On multiple levels, the government relies on the news media to disseminate the news: it is practical, the news media are tied to the government via subsidies, and, most significantly, there exists a “philosophical agreement... that the government does and should rely upon the news media to disseminate the news... [i.e.] governmental information” (Cook 2005, 83). This relationship implies three dominant roles for the news media: adversary, neutral disseminator, or interpreter of “policy processes and problems and government claims” (Cook 2005, 83). As we will see, the media typically takes up the latter two roles, and only very seldom acts adversely, due to further implications of its institutional structure.

The central implication of the institutional role of the news media is that the government’s perspective is consistently privileged. The privileging of the government point of view is a recurring theme in each of the three aforementioned explanations of the news media as institution. By relying on sources that allegedly know and by going to places where news allegedly happens, journalists often use the same group of powerful political players to inform their news stories. Pertaining to professionalism, as journalists ignore their own point of view, other value systems can easily creep into their reporting of the news, further creating unconscious biases. Most significantly, the relationship between journalists and political sources leads to negotiation over news making. On one hand, reporters require “authoritative sources” for their stories, reflecting and reinforcing notions of authority (Cook 2005, 91). Seeking these types of sources is institutionally encouraged because they offer credibility to reporters’ work and provide a consistently accessible source that saves journalists time and effort. Additionally, this relationship gives the officials power as the journalists rely on them. On the other hand, journalists must report issues that are “linked

to journalistic criteria for quality news,” namely that stories are “important and interesting,” qualities that officials can lend to stories (Cook 2005, 91, 108). The relationship between officials and journalists creates news that “is a constant if rarely conscious *coproduction*” (Cook 2005, 109). Ultimately, this structurally-informed relationship creates a bias in the news, specifically one that concentrates “on the events, ideas, preoccupations, strategies, and politics of powerful officials,” giving the news not only a political bias but moreover a governmental one (Cook 2005, 111). As such, the media typically do not take on an adversarial role vis-à-vis the government, but act either as neutral disseminators or interpreters of governmental actions.

Further, Cook’s model has consequences for the agenda-setting function of the media. Agenda-setting has typically been examined within the relationship between the news media and public opinion formation. Iyengar and Kinder define the agenda-setting hypothesis as “those problems that receive prominent attention on the national news become the problems the viewing public regards as the nation’s most important” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 16). McCombs and Shaw take a more psychological perspective, but essentially point toward the same definition. They define agenda-setting as the “ability to effect cognitive change among individuals, to structure their thinking,” further describing it as conceptualizing a causal relationship between the “increased salience of a topic or issue in the mass media” which results in “the salience of that topic or issue among the public” (McCombs and Shaw 1984, 66, 69). Alger defines it similarly, explaining that “the agenda-setting hypothesis... suggests that the news media may not directly affect *how* the public thinks about political matters, but it does affect *what* subjects people think *about*...” (McCombs and Shaw 1984, 126). Essentially, agenda-setting focuses on the capacity of the press to “define political reality” for the public (McCombs and Shaw 1984, 71).

The literature on agenda-setting, as we will soon see with the literature on framing and priming, focuses on the causal relationship between the news media and public opinion. This relationship has typically been seen as the only link in a two-part causal model creating public opinion. Cook’s institutional model, however, emphasizes the important agenda-setting role that the government plays vis-à-vis the news media. Taking Cook’s work a step further, I propose a new model of public opinion formation. There is not simply a two-part causal relationship producing public opinion, but instead a causal chain, with the relationship between the government and the news media as the first link. By examining agenda-setting, framing, and priming under this more comprehensive rubric, we can more fully understand the manner in which public opinion is generated.

Reconceptualizing Framing and Priming

Once we redirect our perspective away from the relationship between the news media and the public and toward the government and the news media, we can reconceptualize the literature on both framing and priming.

Examining the social psychology literature on framing is a useful starting point to understand how it is employed in the realm of political science. Framing is defined as the manner in which information is presented, and is thus used by social psychologists to understand the bearing that context has on people's evaluative processes. Tversky and Kahneman, for example, examine respondents' reaction to either a survival frame or mortality frame concerning lung cancer statistics, with the same information enumerated under each frame. They found that respondents preferred the survival frame even though the information presented under each frame was identical, illustrating framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 254-255). Iyengar examines the context in which information is presented through the lens of political science, defining framing as "the specific concepts and terms used to present choice or decision options" (Iyengar 1990, 20). Investigating the effect that the presentation of poverty in the mass media (both broadcast and print media) has on respondents' conceptualization of the poor, Iyengar concluded that respondents attributed the responsibility of poverty to the individual when exposed to episodic reports, which focused on specific cases, whereas respondents attributed the causes of poverty to societal ills when exposed to thematic reports, which emphasized general trends (Iyengar 1990, 34-35). Thus Iyengar asserts that framing in the mass media "exerts powerful effects on judgment and choice" (Iyengar 1990, 20). Entman's work on framing supports Iyengar's assessment of framing. According to his definition, "to frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described" (Entman 1993, 52). Entman notes that a "frame in a news text is really the imprint of power—it registers the identity of actors or interest that competed to dominate the text," as well as recognizes that journalists can "convey a dominant framing of the news text that prevents most audience members from making a balanced assessment of a situation" (Entman 1993, 55-56). Both of these insights imply the need to examine framing within the relationship between the government and the news media. Essentially, Entman implies that frames can be created not only by the news media, but also by the government, an interesting but under investigated area of the literature.

Like framing, it is useful to examine the literature on priming both through the lens of social psychology and political science. Social psychologists fall into two general camps concerning priming. The cognitive camp uses the concept of priming to assess the relationship between attitude and behavior, which is seen as mediated by conceptual categories. As Fazio et al. explain, some attitudes can be accessed from memory more easily than others, whereas other attitudes are merely available. Essentially, Fazio argues that the strength (or weakness) of attitude accessibility is an important factor in determining if an individual will act on the attitude that he or she holds. The stronger the attitude, the more easily it is accessed, and the more likely the individual will act on it (Fazio et al. 1982, 340-341). Those attitudes that are not as readily accessible but are simply available must be primed, which Herr, Sherman, and Fazio define as the "activation of a category by

unobtrusive exposure to exemplars of that category” (Herr, Sherman, and Fazio 1983, 323). The affective camp, on the other hand, moves away from examining the conscious to the unconscious, or away from investigating cognitive responses and toward analyzing affective responses to symbols (Edelman 1967; Lane and Sears 1964). These notions of priming have yet to fully permeate the political science literature on priming, which in large part is conflated with the political science literature on agenda-setting. As Alger defines it, priming “[draws] attention to some aspects of political life at the expense of others” (Alger 1989, 127). Iyengar and Kinder echo this characterization of priming through their definition: “By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, and candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). Not only do Iyengar and Kinder emphasize standards, but also explain that “problems covered by television news become more accessible and therefore more important in the viewer’s political calculus” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 70). Essentially, the news media primes attitudes, usually about political or social issues, not through controlled experiments (as in the social psychology literature) but through its sheer ubiquity. Although these definitions are almost indistinguishable with those of agenda-setting, the political science literature on priming, like the literature on agenda-setting and framing, emphasizes the relationship between the news media and public opinion. And, as for both agenda-setting and framing, we can reconceptualize priming as it stands in the literature by viewing the government as the media has previously been viewed. Based on Cook’s model, it is evident that the government is nearly a ubiquitous source vis-à-vis journalists. It seems that the government establishes importance and places emphasis on certain issues, and the news media responds to this priming. Once the news media’s attitudes are activated through governmental priming, behavior, or the act of covering stories in the news, soon follows.

Hypothesis Elaborated: Explaining the Rule of the Neoconservative Minority

The intersection of Tocqueville and Noelle-Neumann’s work on minority tyranny combined with the traditional literature on agenda-setting, framing, and priming opens a new area of study. Through Cook’s institutional model of the news media, as well as through reconceptualizing the literature on framing and priming, a clear relationship between the government and the news media around these concepts emerges. By investigating these ideas as they inform the relationship between the government and the news media, as opposed to the typical investigation of news media and public opinion, we can empirically test the influence of the powerful political minority of government on the news media. This investigation is significant as it establishes a link in a causal chain explaining the creation of

public opinion that has been previously ignored by the literature— the link between the government and the news media.

This task is also relevant in light of the character of the American government during the past five years. The Bush administration is not only highly media savvy, but moreover is deeply ideologically driven. The ideology of neoconservatism, with powerful administration adherents such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, Perle, and Wolfowitz, pervades and informs the behavior of this White House. I will show that this administration has, in effect, adopted the typical function of the media as defined by the literature. Through examining Presidential speeches, I will demonstrate that this administration has developed a highly refined and specific set of frames, rooted in neoconservative ideology, that have furthered its ability to prime and agenda-set— for the news media. I will then reveal the causal effect of the administration's framing, priming, and agenda-setting on the news media by content analyzing a set of *New York Times* articles. Ultimately, I will reveal that during the developing discourse of terrorism and the War in Iraq, the news media picked up on the framing, priming, and agenda-setting established by the administration, abandoning the critical role that the media ought to serve in a democracy, and instead facilitating the tyranny of a powerful minority. Essentially, I will show that the news media is part and parcel to the spiral of silence that has occurred in the United States since 11 September, 2001.

Methodology¹: Part One – Presidential Speeches

Speech Sampling

To identify documents epitomizing the Bush administration's foreign policy perspective, three specific criteria were used. First, only Bush speeches were selected. Presidential speeches not only represent a clear White House stance towards issues, but moreover serve as the public articulation of administration policy to the American people and the global community. Press conferences, which were influenced by the questions of reporters and the presence of other political officials, and radio addresses, which, although publicly expressing the White House's perspective, both largely repeated the themes of the speeches and, more importantly, do not receive as wide of coverage, were therefore both excluded. Second, the set of eligible speeches were narrowed by selecting only those ones pertaining to foreign policy, terrorism, and the War in Iraq. I further excluded speeches focusing on general Middle Eastern policy, such as the US's stance towards Israel and Palestine, as these speeches did not directly pertain to terrorism and the War in Iraq. Third, the set of eligible speeches was further narrowed by selecting those within the dates of 11 September 2001 and

¹ The next two sections provide basic elements of the methodology employed in this study. For details please contact the author at weilandm@carleton.edu

12 September 2002. These dates were chosen as they bracket the development of the Bush administration's foreign policy discourse about terrorism, beginning with the terrorist attacks in New York and ending with Bush's articulation of the policy of preemption to the international community at the United Nations. These criteria produced a set of twenty-five speeches.

Establishing Prominence

After choosing these twenty-five speeches, the data was again narrowed by selecting for the most "important" of these speeches, which was defined through the lens of prominence of coverage. Prominence was established by using the LexisNexis database to determine which speeches received the most coverage and saturation. For each selected speech, the *New York Times* was searched during a two week time period after the speech was given, using the search terms "bush," "remarks" or "speech" or "address," and a date/day of the week entry (for example, "September 20" or "Sept 20" or "Thursday"). Every hit that LexisNexis retrieved was skimmed in order to be certain that the search results were accurate, i.e. that the *New York Times* article actually referred to the given speech. A second search for each speech was then conducted, including more specific search terms pertaining to the location, title, and/or subject of that speech. Those search results were compared against the original hits in order to ensure that all relevant articles had been located. This became the first prominence indicator— number of hits— which was entered into an Excel file. Next, the duration of coverage within the two-week time period that was searched was calculated for each article by counting the number of days within the two weeks that the speech was mentioned. This number serves as an indicator of how sustained the coverage was of a given speech. Finally, the percentage of articles referencing a given speech that appeared on the front page was calculated. This statistic further established prominence by revealing more nuanced aspects of saturation: not only are more people exposed to the front page than other pages of the *New York Times*, but also people pay more attention to articles on the front page. Using these three prominence indicators, the most "important" speeches were chosen. The speeches that had roughly ten or more hits, sustained coverage through nearly half of the two-week time period, and over ten percent of coverage on the front page were selected. The final dataset contained eight speeches.

Techniques of Content Analysis

After creating a sample set of Presidential speeches, the documents were read in order to discern the repetition of themes, words, and word senses that reflect specific elements of neoconservative ideology that exclusively pertain to foreign policy, the War in Iraq, and/or terrorism. Additionally, the Presidential speeches that did not qualify as prominent, some press conferences, and a few radio addresses pertaining to the same topic and within the

same time frame were read so that I was well versed on the Bush administration's rhetoric. I identified words, word senses, and entire sentences as the recording units, without coding every word in the text (Weber 1990, 21-22). This technique is much like the Key-Word-in-Context technique, except that I am using human-coding as opposed to computer-coding (Weber 1990, 44-49). Although this may produce reliability problems, this technique enhances validity by examining the words *in context* so as to take into account "the variation or consistency in word meaning and usage" (Weber 1990, 44).

Category Construction and Definition

Essentially, the categories that I have developed code instances of neoconservative ideology in the realm of foreign policy, specifically pertaining to the War in Iraq and terrorism. These are imposed categories, developed in accordance with my theoretical scheme (Weber 1990, 37). The categories were constructed through a careful reading of Presidential speeches, which was conducted through the lens of neoconservative ideology. Additionally, the categories were constructed to be mutually exclusive, without overlap. A full exposition of these categories and their ties to neoconservative ideology can be found in the Appendix.

Coding Speeches

I coded the eight Presidential speeches by reading through them and selecting words, word senses, or sentences that reflect the themes of one or more of the categories that I have developed. Coding was conducted in Microsoft Word, using the highlighting function to indicate which words and word senses were coded, as well as using the Index function to tag each word or word sense with a category and to create an index by category of the words, word senses and sentences.

The following excerpt from the President's address to the nation on the evening of 11 September demonstrates the coding method.

The search is underway for those who are behind these *evil acts*. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. *We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them* (emphasis added) (Bush 2001).

The phrase "evil acts" is coded as Global Moral Polarity, as it indicates the administration's dualistic worldview of good and evil. The sentence "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" is coded as Preemptive War, as this sentence outlines the White House's foreign policy concerning terrorism as conflating nation-states with terrorist groups and justifying the invasion of sovereign nations in the absence of the accepted norms of provocation.

Methodology: Part Two – New York Times Articles

Article Sampling

After coding the Presidential speeches, I applied the neoconservative search terms to *New York Times* articles in order to demonstrate the influence of neoconservative ideology on journalists' thinking about and conceptualizing of foreign policy pertaining to the War in Iraq and terrorism. The *New York Times* was used as it is considered to be the nation's paper of record, and because it is not seen to have a conservative or right-leaning bias— typically it is perceived as centrist to leftist. This choice ensured that the results would not be skewed by using a biased source, such as *The Weekly Standard* or *The American Prospect*.

I selected *New York Times* articles using ProQuest, searching during two-week periods following three specific dates. First, the two-week period after 11 September 2001, the date of the terrorist attacks in New York City, was searched, using the search terms “Bush or Cheney or Rice or Rumsfeld or Powell” and “terrorist or terrorism or terror” and “9/11’ or ‘September 11’ or ‘September 11th’ or ‘al Qaeda’ or ‘bin Laden.” These terms were chosen as they require some reference to the administration and to the terrorist attacks or to the discourse of terrorism developed directly after the attacks. Second, the two-week period after 12 September 2002, the date that Bush delivered his argument for preemptive war against Iraq to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, was searched using the search terms “Bush or Cheney or Rice or Rumsfeld or Powell” and “Afghanistan or Iraq or ‘al Qaeda’ or Hussein” and “‘weapons of mass destruction’ or ‘wmd’ or ‘wmd’s’ or terrorism or terrorist or terror.” Again, these terms not only include some reference to the administration, but also incorporate terms relating to the specific nature of the events at that time, namely the war in Afghanistan, the conflation of al Qaeda and Iraq, and America's international posturing over invading Iraq. Third, the two-week period after 20 March 2003, the day that the United States invaded Iraq, was searched using the search terms “Bush” and “Iraq or Saddam or Hussein or war” and “‘weapons of mass destruction’ or ‘wmd’ or ‘wmd’s’ or terrorist or terrorism or terror.” For each of these dates, very specific search terms were chosen so that the results would be pertinent to the topic.

Creating a Data Subset

As these articles were collected in ProQuest, they were imported into EndNote. Using a more refined syntax, I was able to not only import the articles' metadata, but also the full text of the articles and the day of the week the articles were published. Once all the articles had been imported into EndNote, a universe of 483 articles was created. This sample set was then narrowed by over sampling articles printed only on Wednesday, Friday, or Sunday, as these days have the heaviest representation of news-related articles. These articles were then

numbered 1 to 233, enabling me to apply a random numbers table to this subset of data in order to select 97 articles for coding (or 20 percent of the total 483 articles). Although included in the database, all non-articles, such as letters to the editor and summaries, were omitted when amassing the 97 articles to code.

Coding Articles

The coding scheme used for the *New York Times* articles was more complex than that for the Presidential speeches. Latent content analysis was used to discern the position that the *New York Times* took in relation to the administration's stance on terrorism and the War in Iraq. Latent content analysis is more useful in this instance than, for example, manifest searching for specific terms, as journalists are prone to reword and repackage ideas in a specific style—both journalistic and individualistic. Because of the difference between Presidential language and journalistic language, pinning down manifestations of similar ideas was more accurately achieved by focusing on ideas over words.

Each article was examined for metadata, with coding including title, author, date, placement in paper, and type (news, feature, op-ed). Articles were excluded if they were not topically relevant. Only six articles were not topically relevant, and although they were not coded, they were replaced through random selection to maintain the sample size. Each article was then coded for tone, with the article as the unit of analysis. Tone is defined as the stance of the article vis-à-vis the neoconservative categories that were constructed. Tone could be negative, neutral, or positive. Next, the articles were coded for level of critique, with the article as the unit of analysis. Level of critique was either critical or conduit, with critical stories defined as those offering two or more perspectives, or at least enough information for the reader to be capable of developing an informed opinion, whereas conduit articles either presented one side of the story or heavily privileged one point of view. It is important to note that when coding both tone and level of critique, I attempted to be cautious and restrained in my judgments, erring on the side that would not substantiate my hypothesis. Next, all experts that were cited or quoted in the article were coded. Subsequently, the number of paragraphs that expressed any of the nine neoconservative categories was counted. I followed the paragraph demarcation created by the *New York Times*, and each paragraph was coded more than once if it expressed more than one category. For example, a paragraph could be coded both as Extreme Characterization of Adversary and as Under Attack. Finally, different frames employed by the author were noted if the dominant frame was not expressed by one of the nine categories. Some common alternative frames were economic or historical perspective.

Although it is cumbersome to reprint an entire *New York Times* article, paragraph excerpts are useful to demonstrate the coding method.

In the *war on terrorism*, President Bush leads a nation supportive of his general aims. *Few doubt the malevolence of Saddam Hussein or the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.* By engaging in public debate, by educating the American people and receiving the approval of their representatives, the president would only strengthen his hand. Cloaking himself in resolutions from his father's presidency, Mr. Bush could have ordered an invasion. But to do so without the considered judgment of his nation would only have fostered division at home and discomfort abroad. On the other hand, the *mightiness of a great democracy*, moved by deliberation to unified action, can comfort its allies and caution its enemies (emphasis added) (Schulman 2002, 5).

There are three frames used in this paragraph. The use of “war on terrorism” indicates the category Extreme Characterization of Adversary, as the journalist is here adopting the language of the administration and thus agreeing that terrorism is the adversary and that a war on terrorism is at the very least possible if not desirable. The sentence, “Few doubt the malevolence of Saddam Hussein or the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction” demonstrates the Under Attack category as the journalist is unquestioningly agreeing with the White House that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and is a threat to the United States. The phrase “mightiness of a great democracy” falls in the American Exceptionalism category, as the journalist uses a superlative in asserting that America is, in fact, a ‘great’ democracy. Next, we can glean a sense of the tone and level of critique of this article from this paragraph excerpt. In this paragraph, the journalist takes a positive stance towards neoconservative ideology (as specified through the categories) though the adoption of specific language and ideas. However, the level of critique is critical because the journalist attempts to examine different sides of the issue at hand—in this paragraph the journalist even recommends an alternative course of action to the President in pursuing national support for the War in Iraq.

Findings

Taking Cues from the President

Through coding Presidential speeches, I found a strong and consistent expression of neoconservative categories. Some categories were more prevalent than others. Using a modified Word-Frequency List (think of it as a Category-Frequency List), I measured the relative strength of the nine categories (Table 1). The modified method of measurement employed here accounts for the problem inherent in Word-Frequency Lists of counting thematic occurrences that may not be expressed with identical word choices, since I coded, and am thus counting, words, word senses, and sentences that express the categories (Weber

1990, 72-73). The category most prevalent was Extreme Characterization of Adversary at 37.8 percent, with other categories considerably behind in representation.

TABLE 1
Neoconservative Categories in Presidential Speeches Breakdown (of 286 instances)

Category	Count	Percentage
Global Moral Polarity	36	12.6
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	3	1.0
Preemptive War	6	2.1
Nationalism General	27	9.4
American Exceptionalism	14	4.9
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	108	37.8
Under Attack	48	16.8
Religion	20	7.0
Community Values	24	8.4

The more intriguing and revealing results come from the coding of *New York Times* articles. The coding of these articles makes it clear that the *New York Times* adopted, advocated, and legitimized neoconservative ideology and the specific agenda of the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks and directly after the invasion of Iraq to an extent that is both surprising, considering that the *New York Times* is often indicted as part of the 'liberal media,' and alarming as it is deemed the paper of record.

A simple comparison with the Presidential speeches is useful to demonstrate that the neoconservative categories were not only present in the *New York Times* articles, but moreover maintained a somewhat similar relative emphasis among the categories. As evident in Table 2, the ranking of different neoconservative categories is similar. For both Presidential speeches and *New York Times* articles, Extreme Characterization of Adversary is the most prevalent category, with 37.8 and 34.1 percent respectively. Again, they both rank Under Attack second, although this category appears only 16.8 percent of the time in the speeches versus 30.7 percent in the articles. Still, the similarities in emphasis of neoconservative categories suggests that the *New York Times* took cues from the administration's rhetoric, placing a startlingly similar emphasis as the White House on specific ideological tenets. Nonetheless, it could be argued that these similarities are only due to the *New York Times*' responsiveness to current events, as these statistics do not indicate what position the *New York Times* took in relation to neoconservative ideology or to the White House.

TABLE 2
Neoconservative Category Percentage Breakdown – Presidential Speeches versus *New York Times* Articles

Category	Presidential Speeches (of 286 instances)	<i>New York Times</i> , by paragraph (of 460 paragraphs)
Global Moral Polarity	12.6	3.3
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	1.0	6.9
Preemptive War	2.1	7.2
Nationalism General	9.4	11.5
American Exceptionalism	4.9	1.3
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	37.8	34.1
Under Attack	16.8	30.7
Religion	7.0	2.4
Community Values	8.4	2.6

Revealing and Demonstrating the Bias in New York Times Articles

However, by examining the tone and level of critique of the *New York Times* articles sample set, the role that the *New York Times* played vis-à-vis the administration and its neoconservative underpinnings becomes evident. Of the 97 articles that were coded, 42.2 percent of them supported the administration and neoconservative ideology in some fashion (Table 3). I considered the articles coded as neutral conduit, positive conduit, or positive critical as supportive of the administration’s position. Both the neutral and positive conduit articles serve to repeat the stance taken by the administration and/or certain lines of neoconservative thinking. By giving an unfiltered version of these positions, with either a neutral or positive slant, the *New York Times* gave credence to these ideas. Further, in those articles that were critical but came down in favor of the administration or neoconservative position, the *New York Times* again legitimized— as opposed to investigating or questioning— a powerful and dominant position. This analysis shows that 42.2 percent of the articles supported the White House and neoconservatism, a startlingly large number in light of the reality that objective, fair journalism should produce nearly 100 percent of neutral and critical articles.

TABLE 3
Article Tone and Level of Critique Breakdown – Three Levels of Analysis (of 97 articles)

Type	Count (of 97 articles)	Percentage
Conduit	31	32.0
Critical	66	68.0
Negative Conduit	0	0
Neutral Conduit	2	2.0
Positive Conduit	29	29.9
Negative Critical	10	10.3
Neutral Critical	46	47.4
Positive Critical	10	10.3
All Conduit and Positive Critical	41	42.2
Negative and Neutral Critical	56	57.7

Further, the *New York Times* privileged this slanted perspective through the physical placement of neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles. Although these articles make up 42.2 percent of the sample set, they constitute 66.7 percent of the articles on the front page (Table 4). As previously noted, articles on the front page receive more attention as they are the easiest to see and, moreover, are invested with the highest level of importance (relative to the other articles in the paper). Essentially, these slanted articles were privileged both absolutely, as any article on the front page would be, and relatively, as they were given more exposure in relation to their actual manifestation in the *New York Times* (42.2 percent). These findings essentially reveal that the *New York Times* artificially emphasized the administration and/or a neoconservative perspective, creating a false sense of prevalence for the reader.

In a similar vein, the type of articles that were most often coded as neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical were news articles, again offering a veil of validity to this slanted perspective. As Table 5 enumerates, 47.8 percent or nearly half of the news articles coded were neutral conduit, positive conduit, or positive critical, whereas editorials only had 33.3 percent, features 33.4 percent, and commentary/op-ed's only 30.8 percent. This is significant because news articles, much like front-page articles, are tacitly invested with a higher degree of credibility and legitimacy, and, specifically concerning news articles, objectivity. Readers would more likely expect a commentary or editorial to be biased, but my data show that the opposite is true. *New York Times* news articles from 11 September 2001 to 3 April 2003 are biased nearly 50 percent of the time.

TABLE 4
Front Page Articles – Two Levels of Analysis (of 21 articles)

Type	Count (of 21 articles)	Percentage
Neutral Conduit	2	9.5
Positive Conduit	10	47.6
Negative Critical	1	4.8
Neutral Critical	6	28.6
Positive Critical	2	9.5
All Conduit and Positive Critical	14	66.7
Negative and Neutral Critical	7	33.3

Alleging that the neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles are biased is a serious indictment and must be further substantiated. As detailed in Table 6, the neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles account for 73.3 percent of the instances of neoconservative categories in the articles, which were coded by paragraph.² This statistic suggests bias since the neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles are biased because they most often employ one or more neoconservative framework, demonstrating that they have adopted the language and thinking of the administration and the perspective of an ideology. Additionally, of the instances of alternative frames that were advanced by some articles, 93.7 percent of them were negative critical or neutral critical, furthering the point that these types of articles attempt to report objectively and critically, seeking out perspectives not prescribed by the White House, whereas neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles fall short of these standard practices of journalism (Table 7).

² It should be noted that even though it may seem as if the positive conduit articles, which account for 53.9 percent of the neoconservative category instances, overpower and distort the findings of the neutral conduit and positive critical articles, both of the latter categories expressed a high degree of category usage. For example, the positive critical articles, of which there are only ten, accounted for 18.5 percent of the category expression, whereas the neutral critical articles, of which there are 46, only accounted for 21.7 percent of the category expression.

TABLE 5
Article Tone and Level of Critique By Article Type*

*Omitting two Interviews and one Art Review

News Articles (69 total)		
Tone and Level of Critique	Count	Percentage
Neutral Conduit	2	2.9
Positive Conduit	23	33.3
Negative Critical	4	5.8
Neutral Critical	32	46.4
Positive Critical	8	11.6
All Conduit and Positive Critical	33	47.8
Negative and Neutral Critical	36	52.2
Editorials (6 total)		
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	2	33.3
Negative Critical	1	16.7
Neutral Critical	3	50.0
Positive Critical	0	0
All Conduits and Positive Critical	2	33.3
Negative and Neutral Critical	4	66.7
Feature Articles (6 total)		
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	1	16.7
Negative Critical	0	0
Neutral Critical	4	66.7
Positive Critical	1	16.7
All Conduits and Positive Critical	2	33.4
Negative and Neutral Critical	4	66.6
Commentary and Op-Ed Articles (13 total)		
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	3	23.1
Negative Critical	5	38.5
Neutral Critical	4	30.8
Positive Critical	1	7.7

Critique: A worldwide journal of politics

All Conduits and Positive Critical	4	30.8
Negative and Neutral Critical	9	69.3

TABLE 6		
Neoconservative Category Expression by Article Tone and Level of Critique (of 460 paragraphs)		
Neutral Conduit (4 paragraphs total)		
Category	Count	Percentage (total for each section)
Global Moral Polarity	0	
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	0	
Preemptive War	0	
Nationalism General	0	
American Exceptionalism	0	
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	4	
Under Attack	0	
Religion	0	
Community Values	0	
		Total = 0.9
Positive Conduit (248 paragraphs total)		
Global Moral Polarity	11	
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	13	
Preemptive War	9	
Nationalism General	28	
American Exceptionalism	4	
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	85	
Under Attack	88	
Religion	8	
Community Values	2	
		Total = 53.9
Negative Critical (23 paragraphs total)		
Global Moral Polarity	1	
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	1	
Preemptive War	6	
Nationalism General	3	
American Exceptionalism	0	
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	9	
Under Attack	2	
Religion	1	
Community Values	0	

Critique: A worldwide journal of politics

Total = 5.0

Neutral Critical (100 paragraphs total)

Global Moral Polarity	1
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	11
Preemptive War	4
Nationalism General	15
American Exceptionalism	0
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	38
Under Attack	30
Religion	1
Community Values	0

Total = 21.7

Positive Critical (85 paragraphs total)

Global Moral Polarity	2
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	7
Preemptive War	14
Nationalism General	7
American Exceptionalism	2
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	21
Under Attack	21
Religion	1
Community Values	10

Total = 18.5

All Conduits and Positive Critical Articles

Total = 73.3

TABLE 7
Alternative Frames by Article Tone and Level of Critique (of 32 instances of alternative frame expression)

Type	Count (of 32 instances)	Percentage
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	1	3.0
Negative Critical	5	15.6
Neutral Critical	25	78.1
Positive Critical	1	3.0
All Conduits and Positive Critical	2	6.0
Negative and Neutral Critical	30	93.7

The Life Cycle of Spin: New York Times Bias Over Time

Viewing the development of biased articles during the period between 11 September 2001 and 3 April 2003, certain trends emerge. During the first period of examination, 11 September 2001 and the two weeks following, half of the articles coded were either positive conduit or positive critical (there were no neutral conduit articles during this period) (Table 8). Essentially, a reader had only a 50/50 chance of reading an objective, unbiased article during this period. Further, neoconservative category expression during this period is very coherent, emphasizing the category Extreme Characterization of Adversary, which constituted 50.5 percent of category expression (Table 9). The second most frequent category expressed, Nationalism General, composed a mere 10.8 percent of category instances. Moreover, it can be argued that the emphasis on Extreme Characterization of Adversary correlates with the White House's rhetoric at the time. As demonstrated in Table 10, the neoconservative rhetoric coming from the administration emphasized the category Extreme Characterization of Adversary (32.4 percent of total category expression). This correlation between the *New York Times* and the White House strongly suggests that the *New York Times* took cues from the administration, shaping its coverage of terrorism and the war to reflect the White House line.

These trends continued during the second period of study, 12 September 2002 and two weeks following. Again, half of the articles (52 percent) were positive conduit or positive critical (there were no instances of neutral conduit) (Table 8). Again, neoconservative category expression is coherent, with Under Attack accounting for 48.3 percent of category instances and Extreme Characterization of Adversary accounting for 26.2 percent (Table 9). Other categories were significantly less represented, with Unipolarity/Unilateralism coming in third with a mere 11.0 percent showing. And, as during the 11 September 2001 period, the *New York Times*' category emphasis mirrors that of the

administration. As Table 10 shows, the President's rhetoric emphasized Under Attack most often, representing 52.0 percent of the neoconservative category expression, with Extreme Characterization of Adversary accounting for 40.0 percent. Following suit, the *New York Times* emphasized Under Attack in 48.3 percent of all neoconservative category expression, with Extreme Characterization of Adversary accounting for 26.2 percent. And, as in the President's speech, the other category expression is minimal to non-existent.

In the final period of examination, 20 March 2003 and the two weeks following, however, these trends begin to change. The percentage of neutral conduit, positive conduit, and positive critical articles drops by almost half to 27.8 percent, and thus negative critical and neutral critical articles dominate at 72.2 percent (Table 8). Following this change, the coherence of neoconservative category expressions breaks down, with the most widely represented category, Under Attack, coming in only 35.4 percent of the time (Table 9). Interestingly, other categories have a more significant showing than during the other two periods. Nationalism General comes in with 18.8 percent, Preemptive War with 14.6 percent, and Extreme Characterization of Adversary and Alternative Frames are both expressed 11.1 percent of the time. This last statistic is particularly interesting, as Alternative Frames only accounted for 4.9 percent and 4.1 percent of category representation in the two previous time periods, respectively. Although I do not have Presidential speech rhetoric with which to compare these findings as I did not code any Presidential speeches after 12 September 2002, the increase of negative and neutral critical articles and the breakdown of strong neoconservative categories suggests that during this final period of study the *New York Times* began to report issues more objectively, withdrawing to some extent the *carte blanche* that it gave to the administration and its neoconservative ideology.

TABLE 8
Article Tone and Level of Critique by Two Week Periods

11 September 2001 Period (36 articles total)		
Type	Count	Percentage
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	14	38.9
Negative Critical	3	8.3
Neutral Critical	15	41.7
Positive Critical	4	11.1
All Conduits and Positive Critical	18	50.0
Negative and Neutral Critical	18	50.0
12 September 2002 Period (25 articles total)		
Neutral Conduit	0	0
Positive Conduit	11	44.0
Negative Critical	2	8.0
Neutral Critical	10	40.0
Positive Critical	2	8.0
All Conduits and Positive Critical	13	52.0
Negative and Neutral Critical	12	48.0
20 March 2003 Period (36 articles total)		
Neutral Conduit	2	5.6
Positive Conduit	4	11.1
Negative Critical	5	13.9
Neutral Critical	21	58.3
Positive Critical	4	11.1
All Conduits and Positive Critical	10	27.8
Negative and Neutral Critical	26	72.2

TABLE 9
Neoconservative Category Expression by Two Week Periods

11 September 2001 Period (204 paragraphs total)		
Category	Count	Percentage
Global Moral Polarity	13	6.4
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	6	2.9
Preemptive War	4	1.9
Nationalism General	22	10.8
American Exceptionalism	4	2.0
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	103	50.5
Under Attack	20	9.8
Religion	10	4.9
Community Values	12	5.9
Alternative Frame	10	4.9
12 September 2002 (145 paragraphs total)		
Global Moral Polarity	2	1.4
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	16	11.0
Preemptive War	8	5.5
Nationalism General	4	2.8
American Exceptionalism	1	0.7
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	38	26.2
Under Attack	70	48.3
Religion	0	0
Community Values	0	0
Alternative Frame	6	4.1
20 March 2003 (144 paragraphs total)		
Global Moral Polarity	0	0
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	11	7.6
Preemptive War	21	14.6
Nationalism General	27	18.8
American Exceptionalism	1	0.7
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	16	11.1
Under Attack	51	35.4
Religion	1	0.7
Community Values	0	0
Alternative Frame	16	11.1

TABLE 10
Neoconservative Categories in Presidential Speeches by Date

11 September 2001 Period (data from two speeches, 74 instances total)*		
Category	Count	Percentage
Global Moral Polarity	12	16.7
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	0	0
Preemptive War	2	2.7
Nationalism General	9	12.2
American Exceptionalism	2	2.7
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	24	32.4
Under Attack	9	12.2
Religion	13	17.6
Community Values	3	4.0
12 September 2002 Period (data from one speech, 25 instances total)**		
Global Moral Polarity	1	4.0
Unipolarity/Unilateralism	0	0
Preemptive War	1	4.0
Nationalism General	0	0
American Exceptionalism	0	0
Extreme Characterization of Adversary	10	40.0
Under Attack	13	52.0
Religion	0	0
Community Values	0	0

*These two speeches are the Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation on 11 September 2001 and his Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People on 20 September 2001.

** This speech is President's Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002.

Discussion and Conclusion

My findings, which reveal that a powerful minority group in the government dictated the terms of terrorism and the War in Iraq to the news media, support the causal model of public opinion formation that I developed. Fundamentally, the government agenda-set, framed, and primed vis-à-vis the news media concerning terrorism and the War in Iraq, which, as the literature theoretically implies, likely shaped public opinion concerning these

issues. Further, these findings offer new insights into Tocqueville and Noelle-Neumann's claims concerning the rule of minority opinion by explaining *how* minority opinion comes to dominate in American society. Tocqueville was rightfully concerned about the consequences of government centralization, democratic despotism, and the tyranny of the majority, which he believed often functioned in concert to produce a tyranny of powerful minority opinion. Noelle-Neumann furthered these ideas by incorporating the role of the mass media, developing a model she termed the spiral of silence. I have here attempted to take the next step in this on-going construction of the model of public opinion formation by incorporating the relationship of the government and the news media as the first link in the causal chain that ultimately plays out as Noelle-Neumann and Tocqueville described. The contribution of my work is to further answer the question of *how* the tyranny of the minority is possible, a project that Tocqueville began by elaborating on the behavior of the individual, Noelle-Neumann furthered by investigating the behavior of the mass media, and I have continued through incorporating the role of the government into this process. Not only does my model contribute to Tocqueville and Noelle-Neumann's work, but it also offers a revision of the traditional model of public opinion formation prevalent in the literature, namely that the news media shapes public opinion. Following the implications of Cook's institutional model of the news media, I offer a new model, establishing a causal chain in which the first link is the relationship between the government and the news media, and the second is the link between the news media and public opinion formation.

Still, my study is far from complete, and much work remains to be done on this topic. Research into public opinion statistics during the time period examined in this paper would further my argument by empirically establishing the causal link between the news media and public opinion concerning this topic, which would further shed light on the model that I have proposed. Additionally, increasing the sample set of *New York Times* articles could only increase the accuracy of my findings. Further, investigating material from other print media and even broadcast media would offer a wider perspective of news media coverage of terrorism and the War in Iraq than I have provided. Also, coding more Presidential speeches, particularly during the 20 March 2003 period, would further the comparative work I have done concerning the *New York Times* articles and Presidential speeches (see Tables 9 and 10). Finally, my findings point to the need to research and code *New York Times* articles before 11 September 2001 in order to fully assess the degree to which the news media changed with the development of the discourse of terrorism, if at all.

However, the importance of these findings is not merely theoretical and research oriented. These findings are significant because they have a bearing on the political world in which we live. My work shows that the Bush administration did in fact frame and prime as well as agenda-set for the *New York Times* after the terrorist attacks on September 11th through the beginning of the War in Iraq. The repetition of the administration's well-defined neoconservative frames implies that a highly and media savvy administration can effectively exploit the relationship existing between the government and the news media.

Further, the empirical reality of this relationship illustrates that the news media is part and parcel of the spiral of silence, playing a role quite opposite to what the free press ought in a democracy. These findings are particularly compelling now that serious doubts about the role that *New York Times* journalist Judith Miller played vis-à-vis the administration have come to light. My findings reveal that, much like Cook's work demonstrated, the problem is not with one journalist, but is endemic in the institution of the news media and its consequent relationship with the government. This problem cannot only be addressed in the world of research, but must also be confronted by journalists and policy makers alike, and, most importantly, by media consumers who must demand better from the news media for themselves and for their democracy.

References

- Abrams, Elliott, et al. 1997. "Statement of Principles." *Project for the New American Century*. 20 Sept. 2005. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm> (September 20, 2005).
- Alger, Dean. 1989. *The Media and Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Allen, Barbara, Paula O'Laughlin, Amy Jasperson, and John L. Sullivan. 1994. "The Media and the Gulf War: Framing, Priming, and the Spiral of Silence." *Polity* 27 (2): 255-284.
- Allen, Barbara. 1991. "The Spiral of Silence & Institutional Design: Tocqueville's Analysis of Public Opinion & Democracy." *Polity* 24 (2): 243-267.
- Allen, Barbara. 2005. *Tocqueville, Covenant, and the Democratic Revolution: Harmonizing Earth with Heaven*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Bush, George W. 2001. "Statement by President in His Address to the Nation." 11 Sept. 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> (October 5, 2005).
- Cook, Timothy. 2005. *Governing with the News: the News Media as a Political Institution*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dorrien, Gary J. 1993. *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Critique: A worldwide journal of politics

- Drury, Shadia B. 1997. *Leo Strauss and the American Right*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Edelman, Murray. 1967. *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Entman, Robert M. 1993. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication* 43: 51-58.
- Fazio, Russell H., Jeaw-mei Chen, Elizabeth C. McDonel, and Steven J. Sherman. 1982. "Attitude Accessibility, Attitude-Behavior Consistency, and the Strength of the Object-Evaluation Association." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 18: 339-357.
- Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke. 2004. *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herr, Paul M., Steven J. Sherman, and Russell H. Fazio. 1983. "On the Consequences of Priming: Assimilation and Contrast Effects." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 19: 323-340.
- Iyengar, Shanto. 1990. "Framing Responsibilities for Political Issues: the Case of Poverty." *Political Behavior* 12 (1): 19-40.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kristol, Irving. 1995. *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*. New York: The Free Press.
- Lane, Robert E. and David O. Sears. 1964. *Public Opinion*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc.
- McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. 1984. "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Press." *Media Power in Politics*. Ed. Doris A. Graber. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. 1984. *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social Skin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- The Power of Nightmares*. 2004. Written and Produced by Adam Curtis. BBC Two.

- Schulman, Bruce J. 2002. "Building National Resolve by Talking About It." *New York Times* 15 September 2002: late ed., sec. 4: 5. <http://proquest.umi.com> (October 20, 2005).
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 2000. *Democracy in America*. Trans. and Ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1998-2001. *The Old Regime and the Revolution*. Ed. François Furet and Françoise Melonio. Trans. Alan S. Kahan. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions." *Journal of Business* 59 (4): 251-278.
- Weber, Robert Philip. 1990. *Basic Content Analysis*. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Appendix

Tags	Full Name and Definition	Textual Instances (Search Term examples)	Ties to Neoconservative Ideology
<p>GLOB MOR POL</p>	<p>GLOBAL MORAL POLARITY: All words or word senses indicating moral polarity in global politics. Including normative statements concerning the stance of other nations, verbs that denote how other nations should act, and instances of the imagery of polarity.</p>	<p>-Axis of evil -choice -dark -no neutral ground</p>	<p>Fundamentally, neoconservatives, like Leo Strauss, believe that the “human condition is defined as a choice between good and evil” (Halper and Clarke 2004, 11). The dualistic lens through which they view the world has been historically informed by their experiences during the Cold War. For neoconservatives in particular, the Soviet Union and America – and more essentially communism and democracy – were fighting an epic and moral battle. America and democracy won this battle, and the dualistic mentality of the Cold War had been translated into a pro-American versus anti-American perception of global politics and other nations. Essentially, the democratic global belief that America has a duty to export democracy throughout the world came to shape the thinking of neoconservatives post-Regan (Halper and Clarke 2004, 80). This belief is best encapsulated in the Project for a New American Century’s (PNAC) statement of principles: We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles (Abrams et al. 2005). Essentially, there is a strict division in the</p>

			world, with America and its cultural, moral, political, and economic allies on one side, and everyone else on the other (Dorrien 1993, 376-380).
UNIPOL/ UNILAT	UNIPOLARITY/ UNILATERALIS M: All words or word senses that denote the perception of global politics as unipolar and the stance that America ought to take vis-à-vis foreign affairs as unilateral.	-If they do not act, America will	As stated in the PNAC's statement of principles, neoconservatives came to see America as possessing a "unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles" (Abrams et al. 2005). This role implied not only that the global structure, although hinged on good and evil, was gathering around America's unipolar international dominance in the wake of the Cold War, but also that this exceptional position gave America license to act unilaterally. These ideas were mutually reinforced by the political experiences of the 1990s under Clinton, in particular the Kosovo experience, which led the neoconservatives to "conclude that the Atlantic alliance was more a hindrance than a help" (Halper and Clarke 2004, 95). Coming to believe that America was better off alone due to its military superiority, the neoconservatives essentially combined "antipathy toward multilateralism and disenchantment with European allies," furthering their unipolar perspective and unilateral stance (Halper and Clarke 2004, 92-94, 98).

PRE WAR	PREEMPTIVE WAR: All words or word senses that point to the justified use by America of preemptive military force.	-We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather	A central consequence of the neoconservative belief in global moral polarity, unipolarity and unilateralism is preemptive war. Essentially, as the world is pulled by the forces of good and evil, and as America has a responsibility to maintain global order as well as to protect its interests, it is obligated to engage its adversaries preemptively (Halper and Clarke 2004, 139-156). This core idea is epitomized in the administrations 1999 National Security Strategy: "To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively" (Halper and Clarke 2004, 143).
NAT GEN	NATIONALISM GENERAL: All words or word senses that refer to America and/or Americans in absolute and positive moral terms, encourage supremacy of America, or allude to images or ideas typical of nationalistic rhetoric.	-great nation -homeland/ homeland security -patriotism/ patriot	Rooted in Strauss' diagnosis of America's moral decay and his prescription of myth perpetuation to create social cohesion, neoconservatives have a deep belief in nationalism (Drury 1997, 149-150). In line with Strauss' thinking, neoconservatives maintain that we live in an age of alienation, isolation, and selfishness that comes with the focus on the individual. Nationalism, which can be defined as "a devotion to a certain ideal conception of one's country that has yet to be realized," encourages individuals to look to their nation and its future over their own (Drury 1997, 151). Thus believing in the myth of America, they argue, will better the American people through a refocusing of cultural and moral values on the community and away from the nihilism inherent in individualism (Drury 1997, 150-151, 160).

AM EXCEPT	AMERICAN EXCEPTIONAL- ISM: All words and word senses indicating that America has a unique and moral calling in the world.	- great country -our cause is just -History has called our nation into action	The belief in the American national destiny is a central component of the neoconservative brand of nationalism. Essentially, the idea of American exceptionalism is the myth of America that they believe must be promoted for national salvation (Drury 1997, 151).
EX CHARA ADVER	EXTREME CHARACTERIZ- ATION OF ADVERSARIES: All words and word senses that describe the nature and specific qualities of America's adversaries in an extreme and negative manner, as well as imagery depicting the character of adversaries.	-evil -enemy -hides -war on terrorism	Due to the neoconservative's notion of nationalism, a specific view of America's adversaries is implied. The ideal of the nation is, essentially, not yet realized because of the presence of its enemies, and thus to arrive at the nation's future the enemies must be eliminated. More fundamentally, the neoconservative brand of nationalism not only unites Americans around the positive notion of the American myth, but also around the myth's underbelly: "a shared hatred of a common enemy" (Drury 1997, 152). Essentially, the quest of the "salvation of America – in fact, of Western civilization itself," leads to the belief that "political opponents [are] the enemy" (Drury 1997, 178) Furthermore, it is important to note that enemies are not only physical, but also ideological. As Irving Kristol said, "What rules the world is ideas, because ideas define the way reality is perceived..." (Kristol 1995, 233). As ideas have such power, they too can be an adversary. Thus neoconservative thinking allows for this illusive, confounding, and potentially quite fearful adversary.

UNDER ATTK	UNDER ATTACK: All words and word senses that denote a pervasive sense of threat to America.	-ongoing threat threatened -weapons of mass destruction	The neoconservative vision of nationalism, which implies the creation of a national myth and the presence of enemies, further requires the belief that America is consistently threatened (Drury 1997, 152, 178). This idea serves, in conjunction with the shared hatred of a common enemy, to solidify American identity through negative terms.
RELIG	RELIGION: All words or word senses that invoke the Christian religion, specifically implying that God is on the side of America and its people.	-God -pray/ prayer -God bless America	The emphasis of the role of religion in society reflects the neoconservative rejection of the Enlightenment and its values, preferring a return to traditional moral values. This ideological preference is also rooted in the Straussian rejection of America's nihilistic culture of individualism (Dorrien 1993, 106-115). Further, religion has come to play a strategic political role for the neoconservatives in light of their alignment with the religious right (Halper and Clarke 2004, 196-200).
COMM VAL	COMMUNITY VALUES: All words and word senses that emphasize community and shared values over individual values.	-neighbors -values -serve goals larger than self	Strauss' rejection of modernity was based on what he deemed its nihilistic elements, in particular its preference for individualism and individual values over community and shared values (Drury 1997, 139, 160). This assessment of the modern condition has shaped neoconservatives, who openly value the community over the individual (Drury 1997, 171).